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Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in
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Judith Resnikt
We are approaching the fiftieth anniversary of the enactment
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.1 Reconsideration of the
Rules is appropriate for several reasons, not the least of which is to
pause in admiration of a formidable accomplishment. For members
of my generation, who grew up in law with rules that assume the
desirability of nontechnical approaches to procedure, it is easy to
ignore the tremendous contribution that the Rules have made to
our thinking. Hence praise, accolades, and affection are due the
group which created the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
But this is not simply a time for rejoicing at a prior genera-
tion's achievements. Many in the legal profession now criticize as-
pects of the Rules and demand revision.2 Critics claim that the
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1 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("the Rules") were enacted pursuant to the
Rules Enabling Act, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 2072 (1982)). In 1935, the Supreme Court appointed an Advisory Committee to
draft the Rules. Order Appointing Committee to Draft Unified System of Equity and Law
Rules, 295 U.S. 774 (1935) [hereinafter cited as Appointment of Committee]. With minor
modifications, the Court promulgated the Rules as drafted by the Committee. The ,Rules
were transmitted by the Court to the Attorney General on December 20, '1937, and by the
Attorney General to Congress on January 3, 1938. They became effective on September 16,
1938. See Rules of Civil Procedure, 308 U.S. 645 (1938).
For a comprehensive history of the drafting process, see Burbank, The Rules Enabling
Act of 1934, 130 U. P& L. REv. 1015 (1982). For descriptions of the drafting process, see
Chandler, Some Major Advances in the Federal Judicial System, 1922-47, 31 F.R.D. 307,
493-98 (1963).
2 See, e.g., Order Amending the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997, 1000
(1980) (Powell, J., joined by Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting) (the amendments fail
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federal courts are in "crisis" and argue that some of the current
problems are properly charged to decisions made fifty years ago,
including reliance upon one trans-substantive set of rules for all
kinds of cases,3 upon minimal pleading requirements,' and upon
discovery as a technique for issue identification.5 Many of the crit-
ics hope to limit what they perceive to be an avalanche of litigation
and an unrestrained exploitation by litigants and attorneys of the
procedural opportunities made available by the Rules.
One need neither endorse all of these criticisms nor accept the
empirical validity of the descriptions upon which the criticisms are
based' to join in a call for review of the Federal Rules. The Rules
to curb discovery abuse, and "Congress' acceptance of these tinkering changes will delay for
years the adoption of genuinely effective reforms"); Burger, Introduction to Reducing the
Costs of Civil Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 217, 217-18 (1985); Discovery Abuse: Causes,
Effects, and Reform, 3 REV. OF LITIGATION 1 (1982).
3 See Cover, For James Win. Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules, 84
YALE L.J. 718 (1975).
" Some retreat from the liberality of pleading may already have occurred. See Associ-
ated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983) (up-
holding district court's dismissal of antitrust claim on the pleadings); see also Local Rule Re
Fed. R. Civ. P. 16b (D.S.C.), in 2 FEDERAL LOCAL COURT RULES FOR CIVIL AND ADMIRALTY
PROCEEDINGS (Callaghan 1985) [hereinafter cited as LOCAL COURT RULEs] (court interrogato-
ries to the parties to obtain specificity about alleged misconduct and defenses). But see
Associated General Contractors, 459 U.S. at 552 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("Any concern
the Court may have that the plaintiffs cannot prove their case does not justify throwing
them out of court solely on the basis of the pleadings .... Dismissal for failure to state a
claim is too crude a procedural device to be used to vindicate" the court's stated interest in
narrowing the scope of complex trials.); McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 246 (1980)
(stating that liberal pleading requirements "appl[y] with no less force" to antitrust claims).
See generally Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading under the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 201 (1986).
5 See Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals
for Change, 31 VANm. L. REV. 1295, 1348-61 (1978) (advocating reforms to shift attorneys'
loyalties from client to court during the discovery process).
6 Federal courts might be described as functioning quite well. The median time from
filing to disposition in civil cases in 1984 was seven months; in cases tried, the median time
was 19 months. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR 286 (1984) [hereinafter cited as 1984 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE REPORT]. Fur-
ther, the fisifig numbei of filings could be interpreted as a sign of satisfaction with the
courts. Moreover, despite the current popularity of claiming that both the federal and state
courts are beset by backlogs, some commentators have expressed skepticism about at least
the novelty of the problem. See M. SELVIN & P. EBENER, MANAGING THE UNMANAGEABLE at vi
(1984) ("Our time-to-trial data indicate that civil delay is neither a recent phenomenon nor
a temporary one."); Friedman, The Six Million Dollar Man: Litigation and Rights Con-
sciousness in Modern America, 39 MD. L. REV. 661, 663 (1980) (questioning whether real
litigation rates have risen); Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know
and Don't Know (and Think We Know) about Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious
Society, 31 UCLA' L. REV. 4 (1983) (same). For an earlier cry of distress, which in turn
created an atmosphere hospitable to reform, see Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfac-
tion with the Administration of Justice, 29 REPORT OF THE ABA. 395 (1906), reprinted in
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were intended as an ample umbrella for federal litigation, but the
Rules are silent about many issues of great saliency today. The
simplest example is settlement, the focus currently of a good deal
of attention.7 At a practical level, the Rules do not inform liti-
gators about what pieces of paper must be filed to obtain entry of a
consent judgment.8 At a more theoretical level, the Rules fail to
address what role, if any, judges should play in shaping settle-
ments and how judges should assess the adequacy of the com-
promises reached.9 Settlement is not the only lacuna in the Rules.
Why do the Rules fail to delineate the appropriate pace for litiga-
tion? Why didn't the drafters, who required attorneys to cooperate
in discovery, provide resolutions for the tensions between this re-
quirement and the traditional adversarial stance of lawyers?'0
20 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y 178 (1937); see also Wigmore, Roscoe Pound's St. Paul Address
of 1906: The Spark that Kindled the White Flame of Progress, 20 J. AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y
176 (1937).
See Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. 3012 (1985) (addressing question of imposing sanc-
tions for failure to settle); see also Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984);
McThenia & Shaffer, For Reconciliation, 94 YALE L.J. 1660 (1985) (critique of Fiss's posi-
tion); Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 1669 (1985) (response to McThenia & Shaffer).
8 Rules 54 ("Judgments; Costs") and 58 ("Entry of Judgment") of the Federal Rules
provide for judgments, but neither rule specifically discusses the procedures for submitting
proposed consent judgments. Consent judgments are typically used in actions in which the
litigants foresee enforcement difficulties. In many cases, litigants simply stipulate to the
dismissal of the lawsuit. See FED..R. Civ. P. 41.
' Rule 23(e) does provide that a class action cannot be withdrawn or compromised
without court approval, but no standard is provided for when approval should be granted.
See infra notes 254-62 and accompanying text. Current case law has engrafted a series of
tests for the "fairness" or "adequacy" of class action settlements. See, e.g., Armstrong v.
Board of School Directors, 616 F.2d 305, 314 (7th Cir. 1980); Note, Voluntarily Unlocking
the Schoolhouse Door: The Use of Class Action Consent Decrees in School Desegregation,
59 WASH. L.Q. 1305, 1320-30 (1982); cf. 15 U.S.C. §§ 16(b)-(h) (1982) (antitrust actions initi-
ated by the federal government cannot be compromised without public notice and a deter-
mination that the settlement is in "the public interest"). For a case study of the role of the
judge in settling a class action, see Schuck, The Role of the Judge in Settling Complex
Cases: The Agent Orange Example, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 337 (1986).
The 1938 rule drafters were aware that cases frequently settled. See, e.g., C. CLARK & H.
SHULMAN, A STUDY OF LAW ADMINISTRATION IN CONNECTICUT 20-27 (1937) (examining modes
of disposition in civil cases and describing cases terminated by "stipulation," in which the
parties compromised). Further, the 1938 version of the class action rule also stated that "[a]
class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the court." FED.
R. Civ. P. 23(c) (1938) (codified as amended at FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e)). One commentator
noted at the time that the subsection "clearly contemplat[ed] that the court shall exercise
rather complete control over the dismissal or compromise of class actions." 2 PALMER ED-
MUNDS, FEDERAL RULES OF CIL PROCEDURE 972 (1938). However, the concerns appear to
have been about the propriety of binding absentees, rather than about the quality of the
outcome reached by settlement. See Moore & Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 32 ILL. L. REV.
307, 321-25 (1937).
"0 Edson Sunderland, a member of the Advisory Committee, praised the Rules' pretrial
process (his area of special interest) as substituting "an open, business-like and efficient
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It is not only the silence of the Rules about specific issues that
requires attention; the changing rhetoric about the Rules also mer-
its comment. During the past fifty years, discussions about the
function of the Federal Rules have undergone a substantial trans-
formation. We have moved from arguments about the need to fos-
ter judicial decisions "on the merits" by simplifying procedure"" to
conversations about the desirability of limiting the use of courts in
general and of the federal courts in particular.12 Today's programs
feature "alternative dispute resolution" techniques, advertised as
preferable to trials, judges, and litigation.1" From the left, court
processes are criticized as empty and formalistic, a facade of proce-
dural regularity in an unfair world.' 4 From the right, judges are
depicted as "running amok," lured (in part) by procedural license
into decisions beyond their ken.15 Whether the cry is for more
therapeutic methods of dispute resolution 6 or for "managerial
judges" to control wayward attorneys and to stabilize a malfunc-
tioning process, 17 the requests are often the same: limit opportuni-
presentation of real issues for the traditional strategy of concealment and disguise." Sunder-
land, Growth of Pre-Trial Procedure, 44 CoM. L.J. 406, 410 (1939). Sunderland appears to
have been interested in increased court control of the pretrial process. See, e.g., Sunderland,
The Theory and Practice of Pre-Trial Procedure, 36 MxcH. L. REv. 215, 218-19 (1937)
("[T]here is no reason why the court should not itself take a hand in the investigation,
supplementing the pleadings and the discovery which the parties have obtained, by direct
interrogation of counsel or parties in the presence of each other.").
1E.g., Moore, The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 6 I.C.C. PRAC. J. 41, 42
(1939) ("The Federal rules ... epitomize the new objective of all procedure ... that litiga-
tion ought to be settled on the merits and not upon some procedural ground.").
'2 See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM (1985).
" The Center for Public Resources provided each of the conferees at the National
Conference on Litigation Management, held in New Haven, Connecticut in October 1985,
with a compendium of information about alternatives to litigation. Center for Public Re-
sources, An ADR Manual for Judges (Working Draft Oct. 1985) (on file with The University
of Chicago Law Review) [hereinafter cited as ADR Manual]. See also the materials provided
by the sponsors of the National Symposium on Civil Justice Issues, Apr. 30-May 1, 1986
New York, New York (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review).
" See, e.g., THE POLITICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: COMPARATIVE STUDIES (R. Abel ed.
1982); Abel, Informalism: A Tactical Equivalent to Law, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 375
(1985); Simon, Legal Informality and Redistributive Politics, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 384
(1985); JOEL HANDLER, THE CONDITIONS OF DIscRETION: AUTONOMY, COMMUNITY, BUREAU-
cRAcY (forthcoming 1986).
" Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change: Judicial Supervision of Public Institu-
tions, 1983 DuKE L.J. 1265.
" See, e.g., McThenia & Shaffer, supra note 7, at 1664 (settlement is concerned with
healing the "anger of broken relationships"); Riskin, Mediation and Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST.
L.J. 29, 57 (1982) (mediation "fosters interaction among people and empowers them to con-
trol their own lives").
1" See generally Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in
Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CALIF. L. REv. 770 (1981) (praising managerial
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ties for adjudication by judges and for trial by jury and offer differ-
ent mechanisms for the disposition of disputes.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are, of course, only one
piece of the story. Many other events, within and without court-
houses, have brought forth contemporary criticism of the judicial
process."8 This essay is primarily concerned, however, with the
Rules and the litigation context in which they have operated over
the past fifty years. This is a preliminary effort 19 to make some
sense of why the drafters did what they did, to consider how the
Rules in turn helped to create the environment that has given rise
to the contemporary critique, and to outline the tasks and choices
facing us today.
I. A VIEw FROM THE THIRTIES AND FORTIES
A part of this enterprise is the attempt to understand the
world of cases and problems to which the 1938 Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure were thought to be an ameliorative response. Of
course, I do not (and could not) claim to know the thoughts of the
diverse individuals (such as Charles Clark, William Mitchell, Ed-
mund Morgan, George Pepper, Edson Sunderland, and Edgar Tol-
man) who comprised the Advisory Committee that prepared drafts
of the Rules for the Supreme Court,20 nor do I assume that they
judging); Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 374 (1982) (critiquing managerial
judging).
18 For discussion of the "courts in context," see Sarat, The Litigation Explosion, Ac-
cess to Justice, and Court Reform: Examining the Critical Assumptions, 37 RUTGERS L.
REv. 319, 331 (1985).
29 This essay is related to a larger project, and the limits of this portion of the enter-
prise should be set forth at the outset. First, this article does not purport to be a "history"
of the Rules. Rather, it is an effort to understand what might have animated the drafters, in
order to shed better light on what animates those of us who think about these problems
today. Second, as Professor Burbank's work on the federal rules details, an extensive, un-
published, documentary record concerning the drafting process is available. See Burbank,
supra note 1, at 1132 n.529. I have not relied upon those materials.
20 The Supreme Court appointed William Mitchell (Chair), Charles Clark (Reporter),
Scott Loftin, George Wickersham, Wilbur Cherry, Armistead Dobie, Robert Dodge, George
Donworth, Joseph Gamble, Monte Lemann, Edmund Morgan, Warren Oney, Edson Sun-
derland, and Edgar Tolman to the Advisory Committee. Appointment of Committee, supra
note 1. Wickersham died and was replaced by George Pepper. Order, 297 U.S. 731 (1936). J.
William Moore, an instructor and eventually a professor at Yale Law School, was initially a
research associate to Charles Clark. Although Moore did not become a member of the Advi-
sory Committee until 1953, Order, 345 U.S. 932 (1953), he was considered an expert on the
Rules long before his appointment. See Manton, Preface to J. MooRE & J. FRIEDmAN, FED-
ERAL PRACTicE at v (1938) ("the first text published on these rules"); Dobie, Book Review,
25 VA. L. REv. 749 (1939) (reviewing Moore's treatise).
In 1942, the Court designated the surviving members of the original Advisory Commit-
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shared a collective "intent."2' 1 Indeed, from the history of the
drafting debates (and from what one knows of life in general), it
must be supposed that there was a fair amount of disagreement
within the group.2 2 Further, not all the voices of those on the Advi-
sory Committee can be heard distinctly today. The academics on
the Committee have left the richest record; the practicing lawyers'
views are less accessible.23
Nevertheless, the task of reviewing the public record of the
debate which surrounded the ruledrafting efforts and comparing
that debate with contemporary rhetoric is intriguing. What role
did the drafters claim that their rules would play? These were, af-
ter all, the pillars of the legal community, individuals who repre-
sented powerful interests in the society,24 making choices quite at
tee as a standing Advisory Committee. Order Continuing the Advisory Committee, 314 U.S.
720 (1942). The standing committee was discharged in 1956. Order Discharging the Advisory
Committee, 352 U.S. 803 (1956). In 1958, Congress gave the function of advising the Court
on the need for changes in the Rules to the Judicial Conference of the United States. Pub.
L. No. 85-513, 72 Stat. 356 (1958) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1982)).
The difficulties of divining "intent" have been well chronicled by those who write
about constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
132-37 (1977); Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist
Interpretation be Justified?, 73 CALIF. L. Rnv. 1482 (1985); Stone, Introduction: Interpret-
ing the Symposium, 58 S. CAL. L. Rxv. 1 (1985).
'" See, e.g., Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
85 YALE L.J. 914, 953 (1976) (detailing points at which Clark and the other drafters dis-
agreed, and arguing that Clark, once he became a judge, tended to "adhere to his own views
rather than to the Rules"). For commentary indicating the drafters' disagreement on the
drafts of the Federal Rules, see generally P. EDMUNDS, supra note 9 (annotations include
commentary by members of the Advisory Committee). The drafting process is described in
Chandler, supra note 1.
2S As these footnotes will suggest, Professors Clark, Sunderland, and Moore wrote ex-
tensively about the Rules.
24 The Advisory Committee was composed of leading lawyers (active in the bar and in
politics) and of law professors. Chairman Mitchell, a member of a Minnesota corporate firm
of Mitchell, Doherty, Rumble, Bunn & Butler, was a former Attorney General of the United
States (1929-1933). Dodge, a former assistant attorney general for Massachusetts and a for-
mer president of the Boston Bar Association, was a member of Palmer, Dodge, Chase &
Davies, a Boston corporate firm. Donworth, a former federal district court judge, was a
member of the Seattle firm of Donworth, Paul and Donworth. Gamble was a corporate and
banking lawyer from Des Moines, Iowa. Monte Lemann, a lawyer from New Orleans, was
instrumental in opening the first legal aid society in that city;, he later served on the first
board of directors of the national Legal Aid and Defenders Association. See Frankfurter, A
Legal Triptych, 74 HARv. L. Rav. 433, 445-47 (1961). Loftin, who served as President of the
American Bar Association from 1934 to 1935, had a corporate practice in Florida. Appointed
to the Senate to serve out the term of deceased Senator Park Trummel, Loftin spent part of
1936 in Congress representing Florida in the Senate; he did not seek election after the expi-
ration of his appointed term. See Scott M. Loftin, 1878-1953, 39 ABA J. 982 (1953). Olney
had served as an associate justice of the California Supreme Court and was a member of a
San Francisco firm. Tolman, a member of a Chicago law firm, was also Special Assistant to
the Attorney General of the United States from 1934 to 1938; he was the editor of the ABA
19861
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odds with those made by their contemporary counterparts.25 Why
were these gentlemen, often associated with interests linked today
to the "defense bar," sounding (from our latter-day perspective)
like "plaintiffs'" lawyers? Why did they provide a structure of
rules that, in combination with other factors, permitted the federal
courts to open their doors to a new host of rights seekers?2" It was
these gentlemen, after all, who drafted the rules of discovery that
have shone a beacon on corporate and government practices.2 7 It
Journal from 1921 to 1946. See Major Edgar Bronson Tolman Dies at 88, 33 A-BA J. 1188
(1947). Wickersham, who served only a short time before his death in 1936, was President of
the American Law Institute and had been Attorney General of the United States from 1909
to 1913. Chandler, supra note 1, at 492, 493 n.62. Pepper, who replaced Wickersham, was a
former United States Senator and a member of the Philadelphia bar. GEORGE PEPPER, PHIL-
ADELPHIA LAWYER. AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 343-83 (1944).
The law professors on the Advisory Committee represented several universities. Cherry,
from the University of Minnesota, taught contracts and evidence. AALS DIRECTORY OF
TEACHERS IN MEMBER SCHOOLS 37 (1935) [hereinafter cited as AALS DIRECTORY]. Clark, the
Committee's reporter and one of its most enthusiastic propagandists, was Dean of Yale Law
School; he later became a judge on the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. See Smith,
supra note 22, at 915. Dobie, who had written a leading treatise on federal procedure, was
Dean of the University of Virginia Law School. ARMISTEAD DOBIE, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE (1928). Morgan was an evidence professor at Harvard, and the
reporter for the American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence. He subsequently co-
authored a book which argued that Sacco and Vanzetti had been wrongly convicted. See L.
JOUGHIN & E. MORGAN, THE LEGACY OF SACCO & VANzrrl (1948). Sunderland, a law profes-
sor at the University of Michigan, taught courses on judicial administration and on plead-
ing. AALS DIRECTORY, supra, at 137. He frequently wrote in support of the Rules, particu-
larly with regard to the pretrial process and discovery.
These practitioners and academics were involved in other areas of law reform as well.
As of 1942, Dodge, Donworth, Lemann, Mitchell, Pepper, and Tolman were all members of
the Council of the American Law Institute (ALI). Cherry and Morgan were members of the
ALI Committee on Evidence; Clark and Dodge were consultants to that committee. MODEL
CODE OF EVIDENCE at iii (1942).
Most of the Advisory Committee members were in their fifties and sixties; a few were in
their seventies. Clark was the youngest at age 46.
25 By "counterparts," I mean those who occupy parallel positions within the social
structure. Some of these "parallelisms" may be superficial, however. For example, the Amer-
ican Bar Association, now an established entity, was still in the midst of becoming powerful
during the years leading up to the promulgation of the Federal Rules. See Matzko, "The
Best Men of the Bar": The Founding of the American Bar Association, in THE NEW HIGH
PRIESTS: LAWYERS IN POST-CIvil WAR AMERICA 75 (G. Gawalt ed. 1984) (ABA as expressive
of late nineteenth century reformist interests); RosCoE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQ-
urrY TO MODERN TIMES 270-71 (1953) (discussing the revival of professional organizations).
28 Clark was sensitive to these political aspects. He attempted to assuage those fearful
that liberal discovery rules would "permit ... the manufacturing of evidence" by respond-
ing that the rules were "one of the greatest engines for securing the trust at once from a
witness or a party and thereafter holding him to it." Clark, The Bar and the Recent Reform
of Federal Procedure, 25 A.BA J. 22, 23 (1939) [hereinafter cited as The Bar].
27 See, e.g., In re United States of America, Socialist Workers Party v. Attorney Gen-
eral, 565 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1977) (obliging the FBI to permit plaintiffs' attorneys to inspect
its files about its infiltration of the Socialist Workers Party and Young Socialist Alliance;
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was these gentlemen who wrote the precursor of the class action
rule that has aided (to some extent) the vindication of group
rights.2 It was these gentlemen who insisted on abandoning tech-
nicalities so as to enable consideration of the merits of individuals'
claims.29 In the nineteen-thirties, the drafters of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure made choices to relax pleading rules, to require
information exchange, to make litigation easier.30 Today, many of
the attorneys were required to maintain confidentiality), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 962 (1978);
Parsons v. General Motors Corp., 85 F.R.D. 724 (N.D. Ga. 1980) (permitting discovery of
crash-test results in defective-design suit); PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MIScONDUcn. THE
ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL ch. 4 & passim (1985); D. HENSLER, W. FELSTINER, M. SELVIN &
P. EBENER, ASBESTOS IN THE COURTS: THE CHALLENGE OF MASS Toxic TORTS (1985); Frank-
lin, Suit Unveils 9-Year Company Debate on Warning for Toxic Paint Additive, N.Y.
Times, Aug. 4, 1981, at B7, col. 1.
"As promulgated in 1938, Rule 23 defined limited categories of class actions. Major
revisions of the rule-and of third party practice in general--occurred in 1966. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 19, 23, 23.1 & 24, as amended by Order Amending Rules of Civil Procedure, 383 U.S.
1029, 1045, 1050-51 (1966). See generally Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil Committee:
1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (pts. 1 & 2), 81 HARv. L. REv.
356, 591 (1967).
29 Clark explained that the new federal rules were "but means to an end, the enforce-
ment of substantive justice"; he claimed that "one result of the rules is that it is very hard
to make a mistake which will finally prejudice your rights." Clark, Fundamental Changes
Effected by the New Federal Rules I, 15 TENN. L. REv. 551, 551 (1939) [hereinafter cited as
Fundamental Changes]; see also Clark, The Bar, supra note 26, at 24 ("the very liberality
of the rules" should not be used "to resurrect the old technicalities of formal pleading");
Moore, The Place of the New Federal Rules in the Law School Curriculum, 27 GEO. L.J.
884, 892 (1939) ("Procedure can go forward with the principles of 1939"). Sunderland, more
restrained in his rhetoric, made the same points. Sunderland, The New Federal Rules, 45
W. VA. L.Q. 5, 30 (1938) ("The purpose... is to eliminate technical matters by removing
the basis for technical objections, to make it ... difficult ... for cases to go off on proce-
dural points, and to make litigation as inexpensive, as practicable and as convenient, as can
be done.").
30 It is admittedly difficult to determine how much of the credit for the liberality of
practice under the Rules should properly go to the drafters. In some cases, Supreme Court
interpretation of the Federal Rules has been a critical factor in creating a degree of liberal-
ity that may not have been intended by the drafters. For example, Charles Clark advocated
the use of summary judgment to dispose of non-meritorious claims; he was concerned that
courts were too hesitant in using that rule. See, e.g., Clark, The Influence of Federal Proce-
dural Reform, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 144, 158 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Procedural
Reform]; Clark, Summary Judgments and a Proposed Rule of Court, 25 J. AM. JuDicATuRE
Soc'y 20, 20-22 (1941); see also Smith, supra note 22, at 929-31 (describing Clark's effort to
apply summary judgment liberally during his tenure on the Second Circuit). In contrast, at
least until recently, the Supreme Court has refused to permit summary judgment unless the
moving party sustains the burden of proving "the absence of a genuine issue as to any mate-
rial fact." Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). The Court's approach has
recently come under attack, see Schwarzer, Summary Judgment Under the Federal Rules:
Defining Genuine Issues of Material Fact, 99 F.R.D 465, 466 (1984) ("the rule has become
encumbered with an impressionistic and dogmatic overlay that obstructs sound analysis"),
and the Court may be relaxing its standards, see Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1357 (1986).
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these gentlemen's counterparts are attacking those very choices.
A. The Drafters' Faith
What animated those who worked on procedural reform in the
nineteen-thirties? Were they progressive reformers who thought
that, with professionals leading the way, they could structure a
better society for all? Were they incipient New Dealers embarking
on procedural reforms to serve their conception of the public inter-
est?sl Were they committed to facts, as a source of accurate
description and of normative insight? Were they reacting to the
challenge of legal realism by attempting to reestablish the "rule of
law" through a codification of procedure? Or were they simply ad-
vancing their narrow self-interests by protecting the clients they
represented (largely financial and business interests) and the
groups they led (such as the American Bar Association3 2)?
It seems, in hindsight, that answers lie in all these directions
(and more"). For example, Charles Clark, one of the dominant
voices in the rulemaking group, had a wide-ranging and untradi-
tional set of views. Clark was a committed reformer who saw law-
yers as important contributors to the public welfare.34 Years after
the Federal Rules became effective, Clark bragged about the role
that lawyers, and lawyers alone, had played in the formulation of
the Federal Rules.3 5 Further, soon after Clark had assisted in the
Later amendments to the Rules have also made major contributions to the liberality of
federal procedure. The 1966 amendments abolished the distinctions among "true," "hy-
brid," and "spurious" class actions. FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (as amended by Order Amending
Rules of Civil Procedure, 383 U.S. 1029 (1966)). These revisions have had a profound effect
on civil litigation. See Yeazell, From Litigation to Class Action, Part II: Interest, Class, and
Representation, 27 UCLA L. REv. 1067, 1107-20 (1981). The 1966 revisions also reformu-
lated the rules for joinder and intervention. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19 (joinder); id. 24 (interven-
tion) (as amended by Order Amending Rules of Civil Procedure, 383 U.S. 1029 (1966)). My
sense is that, when the drafters spoke of joinder, they had in mind the combining of claims
perceived to have been artificially split by the distinction between law and equity-and not
the Calder-like configurations we call "cases" today. For a discussion of the impact of the
1966 amendments, see Kaplan, supra note 28, at 386-94.
' Subrin, The New Era in American Civil Procedure, 67 A.B. J. 1648, 1651 (1981)
("The federal rules ultimately were passed as New Deal legislation").
31 Of course, then as now, neither the advocates of rule reform nor the organizations
with which they are affiliated should be too readily equated with a single set of interests.
" See Burbank, supra note 1, at 1106 (the goal of allocating power between the courts
and Congress); Subrin, The Federal Rules of Equity Procedure: An Historical Perspective
15-16 (May 14, 1986) (unpublished manuscript on file with The University of Chicago Law
Review) (thoughtfully addressing how the drafters adopted equity rules' philosophy).
34 See Clark, The Bar, supra note 26, at 22.
" Clark, The Role of the Supreme Court in Federal Rule-Making, 46 J. AM. JUDiCA-
TURE Soc'y 250, 254 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Role of the Court] (rule reform was "a
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rule reform, he urged the bar to take up, as one of its next causes,
provision of legal services for those unable to pay.38 Clark was also
involved in developing information about the courts. Relatively
early in his career, he was intrigued by the contributions that field
(today "empirical") research could make to the legal process;3 7
facts held great sway with him. Clark also had some interest in and
involvement with the legal realism movement, s" but his public pa-
pers suggest that Clark believed that law existed apart from what
the judges "ate for breakfast." 9 In contrast to Clark's ideological
approach, others involved with the rule drafting seemed to take a
more self-interested approach. As lawyers representing clients in
more than one state, they bemoaned the lack of uniformity in fed-
eral practice, and they helped craft a reform that has aided the
growth of multi-state practices. 0
In short, many agendas emerge from the published writings of
the drafters. Some of their efforts were aimed at "slaying the drag-
lawyer's job and it has been accomplished with a lawyer's skill"). See generally Wright &
Reasoner, Introduction to CHARLES CLARK, PROcEDuRE-THE HANDMAm OF JUSTICE (1965).
31 See Clark, The Bar, supra note 26, at 24; Clark, The Function of Law in a Demo-
cratic Society, 9 U. CHL L. REv. 393, 400-01 (1942) [hereinafter cited as Function of Law].
Such a concern was not widespread at the time. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
37 See C. CLARK & H. SHULMAN, supra note 9 (study of Connecticut practice); see also
Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale Experi-
ence, 28 BUFFALO L. REv. 459, 468-524 (1979) (describing Clark's involvement with several
empirical studies of litigation and his growing appreciation for the complexity of doing field
work).
' For Clark's views on the realist movement, see Clark, Function of Law, supra note
36, at 394-95 (praising the "cleansing breeze" of a new "frankness"); Clark & Trubek, The
Creative Role of the Judge: Restraint and Freedom in the Common Law Tradition, 71
YALE L.J. 255 (1961) (critique of Llewellyn's The Common Law Tradition). For his partici-
pation in its work, see supra note 37; Clark, Douglas & Thomas, The Business Failures
Project-A Problem in Methodology, 39 YALE L.J. 1013 (1930). Clark was listed in Llewel-
lyn's "sample" of realists. Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean
Pound, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1222, 1226 n.18 (1931). For a discussion of the realists, see gener-
ally WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MovEmENrr 56-83 (1973).
31 Cf. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 161-64 (1949). Clark was often in conflict with
Jerome Frank when both served as judges on the Second Circuit. See ROBERT GLENNON, THE
ICONOCLAST AS REFORMER. JEROME FRANK'S IMPACT ON AMERICAN LAw 120-22 (1985) (describ-
ing Clark's objections to Frank's practice of sending his opinions, often with cover letters
urging favorable review, to his friends on the Supreme Court); Smith, supra note 22, at 940-
47 (discussing disagreement between Clark, who opposed piecemeal review, and Frank, who
supported interlocutory appeals). See generally MARvI SCricK, LEARNED HAND'S COURT
247-304 (1970) (discussing disputes between Frank and Clark).
40 Members of the ABA were champions of uniformity as a means to "diminish the
expense and delay of litigation." Report of the Special Committee to Suggest Remedies and
Formulate Proposed Laws to Prevent Delay and Unnecessary Cost in Litigation, 35 RE-
PORTS OF THE A-BA 614, 615 (1910) [hereinafter cited as Special Committee Report]; see
Burbank, supra note 1, at 1040-45 (dissatisfaction with the Conformity Act and ABA ef-
forts); id. at 1045-51 (ABA's growing involvement with the reform efforts).
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ons" of their procedural world: the felt needs for uniformity of fed-
eral practice across the country,41 for uniformity of practice be-
tween law and equity,42 for reducing the possibility of technical
errors,43 and for greater court (rather than legislative) control of
rulemaking. Underlying these many goals is a consistent theme,
with a highly emotional quality, that emerges from the published
commentary. Many within the rule-drafting group gave public tes-
timony in support of the procedural system they were creating.
They claimed that the procedures they championed would enable
judges or juries to render fair judgments. The "adversary system"
was their shorthand for the procedures they sought to foster-a
lawyer-based process in which each side was responsible for gener-
ating information to be used either by the parties (to reach an ac-
commodation) or by judges and juries (to assess and then to im-
pose an outcome). Taking into account the many political
41 See, e.g., Tolman, The Origin of the Conformity Idea, Its Development, the Failure
of the Experiment, the Evils which Resulted Therefrom, and the Cure for Those Evils, 23
A.BA. J. 971 (1937); ef. Moore, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by
the Preliminary Draft, 25 GEo. L.J. 551, 552-53 (1937) (discussing early drafting efforts, in
which drafters from one state were often leery of practices of other states).
42 After the Rules Enabling Act was passed in 1934, the Supreme Court expressed its
intention to promulgate uniform federal practice rules for law, leaving intact the Federal
Equity Rules that had been in place since 1912. See Order Promulgating Rules of Procedure
for the Courts of Equity of the United States, 226 U.S. 629 (1912). Clark and Moore wrote
an article in 1935 arguing for one set of federal rules for both law and equity. Clark &
Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure-I. The Background, 44 YALE L.J. 387, 415-35
(1935). Their views, shared by others, persuaded the Court to charge the Advisory Commit-
tee with drafting a single, comprehensive set of rules. See Appointment of Committee,
supra note 1; see also Simplifying Procedure in Federal Courts, 2 U.S.L.W. 866 (May 14,
1935) (address of Chief Justice Hughes to the American Law Institute); Clark, Procedural
Reform, supra note 30, at 147 (discussing the early role of Chief Justice Taft). But see
McCaskill, One Form of Civil Action, But What Procedure, for the Federal Courts, 30 11L.
L. REv. 415 (1935) (dissenting from Clark and Moore's advocacy of complete unity between
law and equity pleading). For cases to which the Rules do not apply, see FED. R. Cirv. P. 81.
43 See, e.g., Moore, supra note 29, at 886 (giving an example under the old system of
pleading of how, "[q]uite naturally, first principles defeated justice"). Although the drafters
did provide for some specific procedural rules for certain kinds of cases, see, e.g., FED. R.
Civ. P. 4(d)(4) (service of process when the United States is a party), they were concerned
with keeping distinctions to a minimum in the interest of simplified "scientific" procedure,
see, e.g., A. DOBME, supra note 24, at 590 (praising the then-proposed legislation that became
the Rules Enabling Act). See also Fowler, A Psychological Approach to Procedural Reform,
43 YALE L.J. 1254, 1255 (1934) (the need for flexibility).
44 As John Langbein reminds us, the core of our notion of the adversary system is the
"advance[ment of] partisan positions." Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Proce-
dure, 52 U. CHi. L. REv. 823, 824 (1985). For Langbein, continental traditions demonstrate
that "the adversaries' role in fact-gathering" is not essential to adversarialism and that,
even when court officials gather information, adversarial activities may still occur. Id. Nev-
ertheless, many within the United States describe the responsibility of the parties for the
collection and presentation of information as a part of adversarialism. I have adopted this
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purposes of the drafters' speeches and commentaries on the Fed-
eral Rules,45 the voices of these men suggest more than the massive
sales effort in which they were in fact engaged. These men spoke as
if they had a belief, fairly termed "faith," in adversarial exchanges
as an adequate basis for adjudication, in adjudication as the es-
sence of fair decisionmaking, and in fair decisionmaking as essen-
tial for legitimate government action. The rules that they crafted
were to enable attorneys, facing off within the tradition of adver-
sarial encounters, to provide information to judges who would, in
turn, produce acceptable (indeed perhaps good) outcomes.
Today, it is hard to get in touch with such faith. Quoting Wig-
more's description of cross-examination as the "greatest legal en-
gine ever invented for the discovery of truth" often generates
chuckles.46 Truth itself seems problematic, let alone the drama of
the courtroom as a technique for achieving it. Even the words "en-
gine . . . for . . . truth" suggest an unquestioning welcome of the
industrial era that has been eclipsed by an understanding that the
"machine in the garden '47 has potentially deadly force. But the
commentary in the nineteen-thirties and forties generally lacks
common usage; the references here to the adversary system denote one in which the parties
have the primary responsibility for preparing all aspects of their case. Further, although
adversarial exchanges occur in other settings, such as administrative hearings, my focus, like
that of the drafters and of many contemporary commentators, is on court-based activities.
"I Senator Walsh, from Montana, is credited with blocking legislation that would have
permitted uniform rulemaking; it was only after his death that the Rules Enabling Act was
passed. See Clark, Procedural Reform, supra note 30, at 146-48 (explaining that some of
Walsh's objections were well-grounded and that the final product was improved as a result
of his criticisms); see also Burbank, supra note 1, at 1063-65, 1081-83, 1085-89 (discussing
Walsh's opposition); Subrin, supra note 33, at 94-98 (Walsh was a progressive egalitarian
fearful of unbridled judicial power).
Much of the commentary on the Rules, notably the many lectures given by Clark, was
aimed at convincing the audiences of the utility and desirability of the new procedure. See,
e.g., Clark, Fundamental Changes, supra note 29 (lecture given at Knoxville Symposium on
Simplification of Legal Procedure). The advocates of the Rules tried hard to dispel the no-
tion that the Rules worked a "radical" change in civil procedure. See Special Committee
Report, supra note 40, at 616. Nonetheless, at least one member of the Advisory Committee
admitted that the
prescription of a single form of action as a substitute for separate proceedings at law
and in equity is a big departure from a procedure to which many of us have been for a
lifetime accustomed .... As to the outcome of the whole experiment, I am somewhat
hopeful; but much will depend upon the willingness of bench and bar to adopt a co-
operative rather than an obstructive attitude.
G. PEPPER, supra note 24, at 381-83.
46 5 JOHN WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRI-
ALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367, at 29 (3d ed. 1940).
4 LEO MARX, THE MACHINE IN THE GARDEN: TECHNOLOGY AND THE PASTORAL IDEAL IN
AMERICA (1964) (analyzing the complex depiction of technology in United States' literature
and examining technology's threat to the pastoral ideal).
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such a skeptical tone.48 For example, in the nineteen-forties, some
of the rule drafters debated the wisdom of shielding notes made by
attorneys (today called attorney "work product") from discovery.4 9
Speaking to the 1946 Conference of the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, George Pepper, a member of the Advisory Commit-
tee, advocated the inclusion of such a protection in the Rules.5 0 In
rejecting the view that "parties to a lawsuit should join the court
in a quest for ideal justice" through cooperation, he explained that
"the Committee has assumed that approximation of Justice can
best be reached in each litigated case if to some extent the case is
in the nature of a warfare between the plaintiff and defendant."51
The Rules were not intended to "abolish war" but only to civilize
it5 2 Pepper's discussion about the Rules assumed the feasibility of
48 No number of examples can "prove" the absence of skepticism. Further, I find it
difficult to believe that ours is the generation that has discovered indeterminacy. But the
rhetoric of the drafters of the 1938 Rules is instructive because it differs substantially from
commentary offered today. See, e.g., Moscowitz, Trends in Federal Law and Procedure, 5
F.R.D. 361, 381 (1946) ("The increasing liberality of the Federal courts toward disregarding
technicalities and the growing tendency to secure to individuals the privileges which are
inalienable under our system of government are trends which portend fuller realization of
moral justice under the law.").
49 Compare U.S. SUPREME COURT ADvIsoRY COMM. ON RULES FOR. CIVIL PROCEDURE, SEC-
OND PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE
DISTmr COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, Proposed Rule 30, at 37-40 (May, 1945) [hereinaf-
ter cited as 1945 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS] (proposing that judges be given express authority
to place restrictions on discovery of work product, but rejecting an absolute privilege), with
U.S. SUPREME COURT ADVISORY COMM. ON RULES FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE, REPORT OF PROPOSED
AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL. PROCEDURE FOR THE DISTRICT COURTS OF THE UNITED
STATES, Proposed Rule 30, at 39 (June, 1946) [hereinafter cited as 1946 PROPOSED AMEND-
ENTs] (proposing that the rule be amended to bar discovery of work product unless "denial
...will unfairly prejudice the party seekin K the production"). See also id.. at 40-47 (i.s-.
cussing the work-product contriversy).
The Supreme Court did not promulgate the proposed 1946 work product amendment.
See Order Amending Federal Rules of Procedure, 329 U.S. 843 (1946) (noi including the
proposed amendment to rule 30). However, the Court did hold in Hickman v. Taylor, 329
U.S. 495 (1946), that the Rules do not "justify unwarranted inquiries into the files and the
mental impressions of an attorney." Id. at 510. The Court's rationale was the same as the
Committee's: the need to maintain the incentives and rewards of adversarialism. Compare
1946 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra, at 46-47, with Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510-14. Had Hick-
man come out the other way, contemporary litigation problems would look very different.
For the suggestion that the reach of Hickman should be narrowed, see Waits, Work Product
Protection for Witness Statements: Time for Abolition, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 305, 310 (1985)
("Witness statement immunity is simultaneously the most expensive and the least justifia-
ble category of work product protection.").
50 Discovery Procedure Symposium Before the 1946 Conference of Third United
States Circuit Court of Appeals, 5 F.R.D. 403, 403-07 (1946) [hereinafter cited as Third
Circuit Discovery Symposium].
51 Id. at 404.
52 Id. The opposing view was articulated by Abraham Freedman, the lawyer who had
argued in favor of disclosure in Hickman. Freedman contended, that "courts ought to move
[53:494
19861 Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline
"steer[ing] a course between the two extremes"--of preserving
"the features of an adversary proceeding" while at the same time
limiting the pursuit of "individual interest."53
To the contemporary ear, it is incongruous to find a pledge to
adversarialism in the midst of a discussion of the discovery rules.
Today's distress with discovery stems, in large measure," from the
all-too-obvious tensions between the duty of "zealous advocacy"
and the obligations of cooperative information exchange. While
technological changes such as photocopiers and computerized data
systems could not readily have been anticipated, surely the draft-
ers must have foreseen some of the conflicts attorneys could gener-
ate by exploiting discovery practice. Why, when faced with the
first major issue about discovery, did they (the Supreme Court and
the Advisory Committee 55) protect attorneys? Why didn't they see
that the logic of their own arguments about the utility of discovery
required serious restrictions on adversarialism as they had known
it? Why didn't they know what we can now so readily see?"
heaven and earth to develop the real facts so that justice will be handed out," that such was
the intent of the Federal Rules, and that the proposed amendment to protect attorneys
undercut the Rules' commitment to facts as a predicate to justice. Id. at 425-26.
It may well be that some members of the Committee (such as Morgan and Sunderland)
had initially envisioned that the Rules would significantly alter adversarialism. But by the
1940s, popular sentiment made such a stance, in Pepper's words, "unrealistic." Id. at 404.
See generally Armstrong, Report of the Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure Recommending Amendments, 5 F.R.D. 339, 356 (1946) ("There is no Amendment
about which there is a greater or stronger division of opinion among members of the Bar.").
53 Third Circuit Discovery Symposium, supra note 50, at 404. Later in the discussion,
in response to a comment by a defense lawyer, Mr. Pepper suggested that as an "unrecon-
structed practitioner," he personally would have preferred that attorneys be given even
more-protection.'He said, however, that "[y]ou-have got to look at the thing practically," as
an attempt to move the committee to "a compromise between the extreme views." Id. at
431; cf. Morgan, Foreword to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 11 (1942) (the Model Code "recog-
nizes the merits of the adversary system but discountenances its excesses").
"The sources of contemporary distress about discovery are complex, and the empirical
bases for the conclusion that the discovery system has been "abused" are limited. See
Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme Court Adopts Discovery Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 CALin. L. REV. 806, 810-15 (1981) (discussing the political bases
of some Justices' interest in discovery reform).
55 See supra note 49.
6 Two obvious answers deserve mention. First, our appreciation of the difficulty in
describing the quantum of information appropriately provided and that permissibly with-
held has been shaped by our experience with the Rules. See, e.g., Shapiro, Some Problems
of Discovery in an Adversary System, 53 MINN. L. REV. 1055, 1093-1100 (1979) (attorneys'
responses to questionnaires about discovery demonstrated wide variance in reading what the
Rules mandated). Second, the drafters may well have been aware of such problems but
thought that the Rules were not the place in which to respond. See Burbank, supra note 1,
at 1106-07 (the enabling legislation intended to demarcate spheres of authority between
Congress and the Court).
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B. Their World and Ours
Of course, the simple answer is that so much has changed in
the last fifty years that their world view and ours are quite differ-
ent. But probing exactly how the world (and more specifically, the
world of litigation) has changed will help guide our current consid-
erations of the Rules. The public commentary of the nineteen-thir-
ties suggests that, when writing their Rules, the drafters held a se-
ries of assumptions about the kinds of cases litigated in federal
court, the possibilities of professionalism, and the scope of the ju-
dicial role. Although these men were framing Rules to accommo-
date the new society that some of them subsequently participated
in shaping, these men also reflected the litigation world from
whence they came. As a consequence, I believe, one of the proto-
typical lawsuits for which the 1938 Federal Rules were designed
was the relatively simple diversity case: a dispute between private
individuals or businesses in which tortious injury or breach of con-
tract was claimed, private attorneys were hired to represent the
parties, and monetary damages were sought.57
By suggesting that the private monetary dispute was one of
the paradigm cases underlying the Rules, I am not arguing (nor
could I, given my beliefs about the limits of historical inquiry and
given my reliance upon the published literature) that the drafters
had such a case exclusively and specifically "in mind" at all times
as they wrote the Rules. Indeed, from the Rules and the commen-
tary, we know that the drafters had other cases "in mind" as well.
Equity cases were critical to their enterprise; a major stated pur-
pose of the new Rules was to provide unified procedure for law and
equity.58 Further, these were the years when labor injunctions and
receiverships were used with some frequency, 59 and the drafters
were surely aware of such cases as they worked. Moreover, some if
not all of the drafters knew that a substantial part of the federal
67 For a critique of models of adjudication based on the traditional private civil lawsuit,
see Fiss, The Social and Political Foundations of Adjudication, 6 LAw & HuM BEHAV. 121,
121-22 (1982) ("structural reform" in addition to "dispute resolution" is a basic model of
adjudication). For a discussion of the influence of other kinds of cases as paradigms, see
Subrin, supra note 33, at 63.
88 See Clark & Moore, supra note 42, at 415-35 (urging the complete unity of law and
equity practice). The drafters also sought to select the "best" rule from the diverse practices
in many states, see, e.g., 1 P. EDMUNDS, supra note 9, at 113-20 (search for best method of
commencing lawsuits), and to avoid the complexity of the past-perceived as technicality
run amok, see Clark & Moore, supra note 42, at 392. For the view that the drafters were
interested in adopting equity modes to give judges greater authority, see Subrin, supra note
33, at 36, 38-55.
59 See generally 0. Fss & D. RsNDLrmAs, INJUNMONS (2d ed. 1984).
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docket was devoted to cases in which the United States (rather
than only private citizens) was a litigant.6 0
In 1934, the American Law Institute (ALI) published a study
of the business of the federal courts.61 The ALI surveyed civil cases
in thirteen federal district courts in 1934 and documented that the
United States was a party in a substantial percentage of the cases.
For example, of the 9,852 civil cases (drawn from the law, equity,
and admiralty dockets) reviewed, the United States was a party in
57.5 percent.6 2 In contrast, the number of diversity cases was rela-
tively small-some 18 percent of the cases surveyed. 3 Thus, de-
spite the by-then growing complaints that diversity jurisdiction
was overburdening the federal courts, diversity cases were far out-
stripped by other kinds of filings.6 4
Some of the researchers involved in the ALI study were also a
part of the group that drafted the Federal Rules.6 5 Charles Clark
played a major role in both enterprises, and it is fair to assume
that ALI data were readily available to the drafting committee.
Moreover, some of the Rules were written to apply specifically to
60 See Appendix A: Estimated Percentage of Civil Cases in Which the United States
Was a Party, 1900-1984.
41 The ALI study marked an important step in improving recordkeeping in the federal
courts. From 1873 until 1939, the Attorney General of the United States had the responsi-
bility for collecting data on the federal courts and issued Annual Reports. Act of Mar. 3,
1873, ch. 238, § 1, 17 Stat. 578 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 522 (1982)). In the 1920s,
interest in data collection grew. In some law schools, a series of pilot projects were begun to
collect information on courts' caseloads. Clark, intrigued by empiricism, collected data on
both state and federal court systems. See Schlegel, supra note 37, at 495-519; see also C.
CLARK & H. SHULMAN, supra note 9 (study of the Connecticut courts). The most comprehen-
sive project in the 1930s was the ALI study that described civil and criminal cases in 13
federal district courts. AMERicAN LAW INSTITUTE, A STUDY OF THE BusINEss OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS, PART I, CRIMINAL CASES (1934); id. PART II, CIVL CASES (1934) [hereinafter cited as
ALI CIVM CASES]. The ALI called for improved data bases, and in 1939, Congress responded
by establishing the Administrative Office of the United States Courts. Act of Aug. 7, 1939,
ch. 501, § 304, 53 Stat. 1223 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 604 (1982)).
62 ALI CIvn CASES, supra note 61, at 47. For statistics on the percentage of cases from
1871 to 1932 in which the United States had been a participant, see id. at 111 (Detailed
Table 1).
63 Id. at 47. Of the 1,816 diversity cases surveyed, 82.2% were filed on the law side,
while 17.8% sought equitable relief. Id. at 56.
44 As noted by Wickersham (who headed the ALI at that time) in his foreward to the
ALI study, "the facts found. . . with respect to. . . diversity of citizenship, afford a very
strong basis for a surmise that the assertion so often made in Congress and elsewhere that
these cases constitute a large proportion of the business of the Federal District Courts...
is not supported by the facts." Id. at 3; see Schiegel, supra note 37, at 508.
'5 In 1935, ALI's president (Wickersham), one of its vice presidents (Pepper), and sev-
eral members of its council (Dodge, Lemann, Mitchell, and Tolman) were also members of
the Rules Advisory Committee. After Wickersham's death, Pepper took his place in both
positions. G. PEPPER, supra note 24, at 378-80.
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the United States as litigant.68 But the public discussion of the
Rules was not peppered with references to government cases. De-
spite the ALI's statistics, the United States as litigant was an im-
age rarely invoked. Rather, the focus of the public exposition of
the Rules was upon their utility in the private civil damage action.
Despite its empirical inaccuracy, the prevalence of the private
damage action as a paradigm case in the public commentary makes
a good deal of sense. First, many of the drafters of the Rules and
most of the audiences-bar associations in the main 67 -to whom
the drafters spoke were from the private sector. The drafters' ad-
vocacy, shaped by the concerns of those whom they hoped to per-
suade, claimed that the Rules would well serve private lawyers'
needs.68 Second, to the extent that the statistical information
about the United States as a frequent litigant was known, it may
well have been discounted. A substantial portion of the litigation
was devoted to "liquor cases," seen as the unfortunate results of
prohibition and happily to be left behind with its repeal.69 Other
cases involved internal revenue and food and drug enforcement,1 0
" See, e.g., FED. R Civ. P. 4(d)(4) (service of process when the United States is a
party).
'1 Clark stated that, in his trips across the country to promote the rules, he addressed
more than 5,000 attorneys. Clark, Fundamental Changes, supra note 29, at 551; see also
FEDERAL RULES Op CIVIL PROCEDURFm PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE AT WASHINGTON, D.C.,
OCT. 6-8, 1938, AND OF THE SYMwOSIUM AT NEW YORK CITY, Ocr. 17-19, 1938 (E.H. Hammond
ed. 1939); RULES OF CIVL PROCEDURE FOR THE DisTrar COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES wrrH
NoTEs AS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE ADVISORY CommITEE AND PROCEEDINGS OF
THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES, CLEVELAND, OHIO, JULY 21-23, 1938 (W.W. Dawson ed.
1938).
" Little effort had to be expended to convince the federal government to support the
Rules; the government had been involved with the drafting and had advocated support for
the enterprise. Initially, the Department of Justice was considered as the body to be charged
with rule drafting. See Chandler, supra note 1, at 488-92. When the Supreme Court turned
instead to an Advisory Committee, it included Edgar Tolman as one of its members and as
the "representative" of the Justice Department. The draft rules had the approval of Homer
Cummings, who served as the Attorney General from 1933 to 1939. See Address of Attorney
General Cummings to Judicial Conference, Fourth Circuit, 21 A.BA. J. 403 (1935); Cum-
mings, Modernizing Federal Procedure, 24 ABA J. 625, 627 (1938); see also Burbank,
supra note 1, at 1095-97.
69 See Wickersham, Foreword to ALI CIvIL CASES, supra note 61, at 3 (claiming that
with the repeal of prohibition, "a very large part of the business of the Federal Courts"
would abate). Wickersham's optimism about the decline in "liquor cases" was borne out by
the data. In fiscal year 1933, more than 11,000 cases were commenced under the National
Prohibition Act; in fiscal year 1934, that number dropped to 923. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
ATrORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, at 142, Exhibit 2 (1933) (Civil Cases to Which
the United States Was a Party) [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REPORT]; id. at 174 (1934).
70 See ANNUAL REPORTS, supra note 69 (1928-1938). A large portion of litigation today
to which the United States is a party is similarly relatively invisible. See 1984 ADMImSTRA-
Tre OFFICE REPORT, supra note 6, at 132-33, 256 (2.7% of the 1984 cases to which the
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not intrinsically high visibility activities. In contrast, diversity
cases had a special saliency and political significance in the
nineteen-thirties,7 1 a period marked by concern with the effect of
the diversity caseload on federal-state relations. 1938 was the year
both of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and of Erie v.
Tompkins.72
Third, the images that shape our thoughts are often not based
upon statistical data. Rather, we are drawn to "vivid" information,
which is typically not that presented in tabular form.7s This phe-
nomenon is evident not only from the conversations of a half cen-
tury ago but also from the contemporary commentary about proce-
dure. Two kinds of cases have fueled debate about current reforms.
One is the large scale "public law" or "structural reform"7 4 lawsuit.
The other is the complex, multi-party action (the "Big Case" 75)
that includes months of discovery and the prospect of a lengthy
trial. Both kinds of cases are statistical rarities on the federal
docket s but have nonetheless captured the debate. A similar "viv-
idness" phenomenon can be seen in the current discussion of the
frequency of adjudication as compared to settlement. Many of to-
day's commentators claim a 95 percent settlement rate because 5
percent of the cases filed in federal court are tried. Trial is the
vivid adjudicatory process. What is ignored is the substantial vol-
ume of non-trial adjudication; some 35 percent of all federal cases
United States was a party were Federal Tort Claims Act cases, 2.7% were student loan
recoupment actions, 3.4% were tax collection activities). Similarly, although 27% of the
cases to which the United States was a party involved social security issues, our attention is
captured by the class action social security cases that challenge the practices by which the
agency operates. See, e.g., Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir. 1984); rev'd, 105 S. Ct.
583 (1984).
71 See, e.g., Clark, Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 19
A.BA J. 499, 503 (1933) ("[W]hile congestion of the federal courts resulting from the diver-
sity cases is perhaps not proved,. . . their number, in the light of their controversial nature,
is substantial."). For a critique of diversity jurisdiction, see S. REP. No. 530, 72nd Cong., 1st
Sess. (1932); Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State
Courts, 13 CORNL L.Q. 499, 522-30 (1928).
72 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
73 See R. NISBETr & L. Ross, HUMAN INFERENCE- STRATEGY AND SHORTCOMINGS OF SO-
CIAL JUDGMENT 43-62 (1980).
74 See Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HRv. L. Rnv. 1281
(1976); Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARv. L.
REv. 1, 2 (1979).
7' See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 44, at 825.
76 See 1984 ADMn ISTRATwV OFFICE REPORT, supra note 6, at 134 (diagram showing the
distribution of civil cases by type). For example, in 1984 only 0.4% of the civil cases filed
were class actions, id. at 160, and 2% involved securities or antitrust claims, id. at 253-55
(extrapolated).
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are disposed of by rulings on motions for dismissal or for summary
judgment. 77
Finally, the dominance of the paradigm of private monetary
disputes stems from the absence of the many events that have
caused us to change our paradigms; today, very different images
come to mind when we think about the federal court docket. A
myriad of developments-in legislation, constitutional interpreta-
tion, and procedural rulemaking-has given federal litigation a dif-
ferent complexion. The nineteen-thirties were the years before the
New Deal legislation was firmly in place, before the surge of cen-
tralization of federal power. This was the era before implied pri-
vate causes of action, before the rise of civil rights litigation, before
much federal court hospitality towards rights seekers, before inten-
sive litigation against federal agencies, before the reformulation of
the class action rule, before the "due process" revolution. This was
the era before securities and antitrust class actions, before those
multi-partied, multi-issued lawsuits whose existence depends, in
part, on the 1938 Federal Rules. 78
Given a paradigm of private damage actions, some of the basic
choices embedded within the 1938 Rules make considerable sense.
First, the decision to write a single trans-substantive set of rules is
particularly appealing if one discounts discontinuities among kinds
of cases. With a single paradigm, it is easier to overlook the sali-
ency of the distinctions among various kinds of cases and hence to
underestimate the need for rulemaking to take variation into ac-
count.79 Second, by positing a private dispute between property
owners or between an injured individual and an alleged wrongdoer,
77 Conversation with David Gentry, Administrative Office of the United States Courts
(March 21, 1986).
"' Changing procedural rights reflect and inspire changes in basic understandings. For
example, prior to the late 1960s, federal courts often responded with a "hands-off" attitude
towards prison litigation. Kaufman, Foreword to 2 PRisoNEas' RIHTS SOURCEOOK at ix (I.
Robbins ed. 1980); see also Note, Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial
Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963). The change in pos-
ture towards that type of litigation affected our understanding of the role of courts and,
along with other civil rights litigation, gave new meaning to the "public" nature of "civil"
cases. For thoughtful analysis of the interdependence of social conditions and procedural
devices in the class action context, see Yeazell, Group Litigation and Social Context: To-
ward a History of the Class Action, 77 COLUM. L. REv. 866 (1977), and Yeazell, From Group
Litigation to Class Action, Part I: The Industrialization of Group Litigation, 27 UCLA L.
REv. 514 (1980).
7' Trans-substantive rules were inspired by other concerns as well, including distress at
the injustices worked by stringent pleading requirements, see, e.g., Moore, supra note 29, at
886-87, and interest in permitting more discretion and authority to the professional judges,
see Subrin, supra note 33, at 57-70.
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one may also be tempted to posit that the parties have resources,
and in some cases, roughly comparable resources. In the context of
rough comparability, a lawyer-based adversarial system has its
strongest appeal. ("The [Advisory] Committee has not attempted
to abolish war."80)
To rely upon lawyer-based adversarialism, 1 one must sub-
scribe to a series of assumptions about the participants. First, pro-
ponents of this model must posit that the disputants are rational,
competent actors who make deliberate decisions calculated to en-
hance their positions. Second, proponents must assume that the
disputants have access to resources (in terms of dollars and of
power) which in turn enable the generation of information and
which give the disputants the opportunity to exercise choices
among competing options. Third, when relying upon attorneys (to
generate information, to relate information to their clients, and to
be conduits of information from client to opponent and to court),
the assumption is that the attorneys, acting as agents for dispu-
tants, have interests that coincide with those of their clients. A fi-
nal, and central, assumption is that competition between balanced
opponents (these autonomous attorney-client units) will lead to
the triumph of truth-or at least to the emergence of insights with
normative power. With the two sides of a dispute more or less
evenly matched, then at least in theory, the contest permits the
"correct" winner to emerge.
These assumptions pervade the published commentary on the
1938 Rules. 2 The drafters did not speak of the individuals who
90 Pepper, Third Circuit Discovery Symposium, supra note 50, at 404.
$1 Compare Langbein, supra note 44, who argues for a limited version of adversarial
litigation, in which primary responsibility for fact gathering is assigned to the court. If his
version were commonplace and if the parties were to be relatively passive during the fact-
finding stage, then some of the assumptions set forth in the text could be relaxed.
"I Return, for example, to the commentary about the work-product debate. The Advi-
sory Committee's proposal in 1946 to protect attorneys appears animated by assumptions of
equal access to information and the need to keep incentives high. The Committee recom-
mended that judges consider whether information requested by opponents "penalizes the
diligent" or "puts a 'premium on laziness."' 1946 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 49, at
46-47. The Supreme Court's discussion of the problem in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,
510-12 (1947), also relied upon a vision of relatively comparable adversaries; rejecting the
argument that individual plaintiffs were at a disadvantage when faced with corporate de-
fendants, the Court said: "Discovery... is not a one-way proposition. It is available in all
types of cases at the behest of any party, individual or corporate, plaintiff or defendant."
329 U.S. at 507. Subsequently, some of the rule drafters acknowledged some of the problems
with their model. For example, in his 1955 Columbia lectures, Edmund Morgan, one of the
members of the original Advisory Committee, noted that the "theory of our adversary sys-
tem is attractive in statement. . . but it seldom fits the facts in modern litigation," in part
because of inequality of resources. He nonetheless concluded that the Federal Rules of Civil
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today draw some of our attention, the litigants without resources
who lack attorneys8 or the litigants with indifferent, inattentive,
or overly aggressive counsel. Once again, upon reflection, the dif-
ferences between their sets of images and ours make sense. In the
days of the drafting of the Federal Rules, many individuals with-
out resources simply had no way of litigating cases. There was no
Legal Services Corporation; there were fewer fee-shifting statutes
and a smaller public interest bar. By and large, active litigants in
the federal courts had to be those with resources. To the extent
that poor plaintiffs were before the federal courts, the plaintiffs
could have been represented on a contingency fee basis, and the
lawyers would have provided some of the resources that their cli-
ents lacked.84 To the extent poor criminal defendants were before
the federal courts, they lacked many of the "rights" that courts in
subsequent years came to recognize. Moreover, the criininal side
was considered a discrete phenomenon from the civil enterprise,85
Procedure had taken the "first step toward making a lawsuit a rational proceeding for dis-
covery of the factual basis of a controversy." EDMUND MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF
UNDER THE ANGLo-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF LITIGATION 34-35 (1975) (reprint of 1955 Charpen-
tier Lecture at Columbia Law School).
" 'fIt 6 s nfot appear that conceri about the abilities of the impoverished to litigate
was great when the Rules were formulated. See, e.g., MAYNARD PIRSIG, CASES AND MATERIALS
ON JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 79 (1946) (devoting only a "note" to the problem that the "ex-
pense of litigation may result in the denial of justice to those unable to pay the cost"); id. at
968-1008 (chapter on "Agencies and Methods of Reform" does not mention problems of the
poor as litigants). However, in 1919, the Carnegie Foundation did sponsor a study of legal
services in the United States which in turn prompted some interest among the bar. See
REGINALD HEBER SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR (3d ed. 1924). In that volume, much of the
discussion of "the needs of poorer people" focuses upon the provision of small claims court
....,and on.administrativ remedies. Id. at. ix (preface t. th.e third edition by Henry Pritchett,
Presideit'of the Carnegie Fbundation). Iii ti%"studk, Smiith made a vehement plea for provi-
sion of services to the poor: "It must be possible for the humblest to invoke the protection
of the law, through proper proceedings in the courts, .. or freedom and equality vanish
into nothingness." Id. at 5.
" For discussions of the complexity of lawyers a lenders to their clients, see Schwartz
& Mitchell, An Economic Analysis of the Contingent -Fee in Personal-Injury Litigation, 22
STAN. L. REv. 1125 (1970). Cf. Kritzer, Felstiner, Sarat & Trubek, The Impact of Fee Ar-
rangement on Lawyer Effort, 19 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 251, 272 (1985) (in small cases, attorneys
paid on an hourly basis put in more effort than do attorneys paid under a contingent fee
arrangement; on larger cases, no significant differences emerged).
as It is ironic that the rule drafters who saw a false dichotomy of "law" and "equity"
appeared quite insensitive to the artificiality of the delineation "civil" and "criminal." Cf.
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 (1980) (deciding whether the penalties imposed by the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act were "civil" or "criminal" and hence whether constitu-
tional protections of criminal defendants could be invoked). In 1933, Congress authorized
the Court to promulgate rules for criminal appellate cases, Act of Feb. 24, 1933, Pub. L. No.
371, 47 Stat. 904 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3772 (1982)), and in 1940, Congress authorized the
Court to promulgate uniform federal criminal rules, Act of June 29, 1940, ch. 445, 54 Stat.
688 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1982)); see Order Promulgating Rules of
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and the imbalance evidenced there would not have undermined the
civil paradigm of fairly-matched adversarial encounters.8 6
Assuming a fight between individuals or corporations with re-
sources, the drafters of the Federal Rules sought to make that fight
more "fair," to diminish the technicalities and the distractions, to
sharpen the focus on the merits. Take as a paradigm the private
damage action, add hopes for legal professionalism and for the ac-
cessibility and utility of information, and then the faith in the law-
yer-based, adjudicatory, adversarial procedure embodied in the
1938 Federal Rules makes sense.
II. THE NINETEEN-SIXTIES AND BEYOND
From their effective date in 1938 until the early nineteen-sev-
enties, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure received generally
good press. While the rhetoric moved away from the initially gush-
ing, laudatory comments 7 to somewhat more subdued praise,88 the
Criminal Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, 323 U.S. 821 (1944); see
also T. Clark, An Indorsement of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 5 F.R.D. 305 (1946);
Dession, The New Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure: I, 55 YALE L.J. 694 (1946).
89 I have not yet uncovered descriptions of how poor civil defendants fared against the
United States as plaintiff. For discussions of legal services available to indigent litigants in
other forums, see EMERY BROWNELL, LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES (1951); R SMITH,
supra note 83. Smith's survey of legal aid organizations estimated that, by 1916, 41 organi-
zations provided services (primarily for wage claims and domestic issues) to 117,201 clients.
Id. at xi. The majority of the organizations were financed by private charity, although nine
cities provided some public support. Id. at 148. By 1949, 92 legal services organizations ex-
isted, E. BROWNELL, supra, at 26, and by 1959, 79% of the cities with populations in excess
of 100,000 had legal aid offices, id., Supp. 1961, at 68. Once again, much of the funding came
from private charity; in 1962, most of the 236 programs nationwide were .dependent upon
private gifts. EARL JOHNSON, JUSTICE AND REFORme THin FoRMATriVE YEARS OF THE AMERICAN
LEGAL SERVICES PROGRAM 9-10 (1978). In 1967, federal funding became available and legal
services increased substantially.
87 See, e.g., Chandler, supra note 1, at 515 ("In truth the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure are probably the greatest single element of progress in the ... federal trial courts in
this century."); Clark, Procedural Reform, supra note 30, at 152 ("the universal chorus of
approval is quite phenomenal"); Holtzoff, Instruments of Discovery Under Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 41 MICH. L. RV. 205, 224 (1942) (the Rules provide a "simple and effica-
cious means" of obtaining necessary information); Mitchell, Uniform State and Federal
Practice: A New Demand for More Efficient Judicial Procedure, 24 A.BA J. 981, 983 (1938)
(urging Illinois attorneys to follow the federal model and to "perfect" the judicial appara-
tus); Pike & Willis, Federal Discovery in Operation, 7 U. CHL L. REv. 297, 327 (1940)
("[R]emarkably enough, the judges, casting off the old shackles, have applied the new scope
of examination [under Rule 37] almost literally. Federal discovery is in operation."); Pike &
Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure (pt. 1), 38 COLUM. L. REv. 1179,
1180 (1938) ("[Tlhe new federal deposition-discovery practice affords the greatest opportu-
nity for adequate trial preparation in the history of civil procedure.").
" Charles Clark remained exuberant. As late as 1963, he wrote: "Viewed in perspective
the success of the federal system is nothing short of phenomenal. Enthusiastic support has
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impression gleaned from the commentary is a positive one. The
commentators saw the advantages of the Rules89 and generally en-
dorsed the system that the Rules had structured.90
Moreover, during the nineteen-sixties, the belief in adjudica-
tory procedure that the Rules had espoused was adopted by the
Supreme Court, indeed was "constitutionalized"9 1 to some extent,
in a variety of cases-most notably those involving criminal proce-
dure and administrative law. Mandating a right to counsel in crim-
inal cases and other rights for criminal defendants,92 the Court en-
dorsed lawyer-based adversarial encounters as the mechanism for
generating acceptable outcomes. Further, when obliging a state to
provide a hearing prior to the withdrawal of welfare benefits, the
Court expounded upon its faith in adjudicatory processes.
Goldberg v. Kelly"3 stands as a striking illustration of a major-
ity of the Court's equation of fair outcome with adjudicatory pro-
cess. The "process" held to be "due" a welfare beneficiary prior to
the withdrawal of benefits closely resembled courtroom procedure:
notice, an opportunity to present witnesses, the right to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses, and a statement of reasons
rendered by an impartial decisionmaker who considered only the
long been a matter of ordinary knowledge. . . . No criticism of major character now ap-
pears." Clark, Role of the Court, supra note 35, at 254 (rejecting a critique by Justices Black
and Douglas of the Court's role in rulemaking).
89 See Speck, The Use of Discovery in United States District Courts, 60 YALE L.J.
1132, 1155 (1951) ("discovery does appear to have fulfilled expectations in making informa-
tion and evidence readily available to all parties"). But see Caskey & Young, Some Limita-
tions Upon Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 VA. L. REv. 348 (1942)
(advocating limitations on interrogatories); Rosenberg, Sanctions to Effectuate Pretrial Dis-
covery, 58 COLUM. L. REv. 480, 497 (1958) (expressing concern about the "notable failings in
. . . content and administration" of the discovery rules); Comment, Tactical Use and Abuse
of Depositions Under the Federal Rules, 59 YALE L.J. 117, 138 (1949) (concluding on the
basis of confidential interviews with judges, attorneys, and court reporters that
abuse-defined as expense, delay, and overly broad inquiries-occurred in complex litiga-
tion because of strategic exploitation of the Rules). See generally The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: 1938-1958, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 435 (1958).
90 The development of a standing Advisory Committee to oversee rule amendment was
seen as a continuation of the rulemaking process and, at least by Clark, as a mechanism to
keep the rules free from the encumbrances that judicial "glosses" could impose. Clark,
"Clarifying" Amendments to the Federal Rules?, 14 OHIO ST. L.J. 241, 245, 247 (1953); see
also Clark, The Proper Function of the Supreme Court's Federal Rules Committee, 28
A.BA J. 521 (1942).
:' Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 TEx. L. REv. 579 (1984).
92 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114
(1975) (right to preliminary hearing); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 236-38 (1967)
(right to counsel at post-indictment lineup).
93 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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information presented at a hearing."' Further, while the Court did
not mandate counsel for welfare recipients, Justice Brennan surely
wrote so that, if he could command a majority in the future, coun-
sel would be the next right announced. "The right to be heard
would be, in many cases, of little avail without the right to be
heard by counsel, '9 5 he said for the majority as he declined to re-
quire state-provided lawyers but permitted counsel otherwise
funded to attend the welfare termination hearings. As Goldberg
exemplifies, during the fifties, sixties, and early seventies, the ma-
jor cases about civil, criminal, and administrative procedure" be-
speak a commitment to adjudication that accords comfortably with
the value choices expressed in the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. The Court (and the Congress as well) took the model shaped
by the imagery of a private civil damage action and transposed it
to disputes between government and citizenry.
A major difficulty, however, anticipated but not decided by
Court opinions of those years, was the problem of parity. Adver-
sarialism is a plausible mechanism for generating information lead-
ing to acceptable outcomes and for validating individual dignity
only when the adversaries are roughly comparable-when each side
has similar resources. But, as is well known, many who attempt
strategic adversarial interaction have few resources, little informa-
tion, and disloyal, indifferent, or nonexistent agents. In the litiga-
tion world of the nineteen-sixties and thereafter, imbalance has be-
come a visible norm, rather than an unstated exception or an
invisible reality.97 When gross imbalances are commonplace and
patent, a belief in adversarialism has a hollow ring. Hence, a major
question for the nineteen-seventies was whether the Court (or
sometimes Congress), having mandated adjudicatory procedure,
would also require government subsidies or one way fee-shifting to
94 Id. at 267-68, 271.
95 Id. at 270 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932)).
9' See, e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (liberal pro se pleading); Adickes v.
S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (stringent requirements for the grant of summary
judgment); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel); Douglas v. Califor-
nia, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right to counsel on appeal); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975)
(procedural safeguards prior to student suspensions); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972) (procedural safeguards prior to parole revocation).
'" Earlier commentary did occasionally recognize the problems of the costs of legal ser-
vices, of poor techniques for delivery of services, and of the disadvantages suffered by those
without resources. See, e.g., Clark & Corstvet, The Lawyer and The Public: An A.A.L.S.
Survey, 47 YALE. L.J. 1272, 1275-85 (1938) (survey of lower-class and middle-class access to
lawyers); Llewellyn, The Uncovered Needs for Legal Service, 16 TENN. L. REv. 641, 648
(1941) ("If the charge at the toll gate to legal rights is too high, you have not got justice
under the law!").
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help fulfill the promise of adversarialism.
As is familiar, the answer has turned out, by and large, to be
no-or, at least, not yet or not fully. In a series of cases, the Court
has declined to insist upon substantial subsidies to poor rights-
holders to provide them with mechanisms to enforce those rights.
Although holding that the Constitution required the waiver of fil-
ing fees for poor divorce plaintiffs, 8 the Court did not order fee
waivers for impoverished petitioners seeking discharges in bank-
ruptcy99 or for poor appellants seeking review of agency decisions
that had reduced their welfare benefits.100 Although demanding the
provision of counsel to indigent defendants faced with incarcera-
tion,101 the Court declined to insist upon free counsel for criminal
defendants faced with fines 0 2  or for every parent defending
against the termination of parental rights. 03 The Court has also
turned a deaf ear to coinplaints about the adequacy of state-pro-
vided counsel in criminal cases; refusing to impose performance
standards, the Court has erected herculean obstacles to claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel.104
Congress has been more forthcoming than the Court. In 1974,
Congress created the Legal Services Corporation;105 in 1976, Con-
gress enacted a major one-way fee-shifting scheme, the Civil Rights
Attorneys' Fee Act, which provided an important source of funding
for those who challenge state action on civil rights grounds. 0 6
More recently, however, executive-sponsored initiatives have re-
duced the legal services program, °0 and the Court has interpreted
98 Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374 (1971).
99 United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 449-50 (1973).
100 Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 656 (1973).
1 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963) (felonies); Argersinger v. Hamlin,
407 U.S. 25, 40 (1972) (any deprivation of liberty regardless of classification of offense).
102 Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (actual imprisonment, not threat of im-
prisonment, is the "line defining the constitutional right to appointment of counsel").
103 Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981) (rejecting per se
requirement of counsel).
14 bCriiinal defendants who seek to overturn convictions because of incompetent coun-
sel must show not only incompetence, but also the likelihood that the outcome would have
been different had competent counsel been provided. Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct.
2052, 2066-67 (1984). Moreover, such a showing must be made on the record created by the
inadequate attorney. Id. at 2069; see also Hill v. Lockhart, 106 S. Ct. 366, 370 (1985)
(Strickland test applied to guilty pleas).
105 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996-29961 (1982). For a critique of the program, see Abel, Law With-
out Politics: Legal Aid Under Advanced Capitalism, 32 UCLA L. REv. 474, 532-33 (1985).
100 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
107 See McDaniel, LSC, round five, 71 ABA J., Mar. 1985, at 33 (the Reagan adminis-
tration makes fifth annual proposal to eliminate funds for the Legal Services Corporation).
Although the efforts to eliminate funding have been unsuccessful, the President has been
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the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fee Act to make its provisions less
attractive. 108
Waiver of access fees, government-financed representation',
and one-way fee-shifting are not the only ways to subsidize poor
litigants. Another technique is to focus on specific aspects of litiga-
tion, such as production of evidence. One option is to provide a
direct subsidy. In a few instances, such as when an impoverished
putative father lacked funds for a blood test, the Supreme Court
responded favorably by ordering a state payment. 109 However, the
Court has carefully circumscribed the reach of such opinions,'and
other cases have etched the limitations of a "right" to state-funded
evidence. 1 0 A second way to reduce information costs is to rely
upon information sharing; well-to-do opponents could be required
to provide information to less well-heeled adversaries. Brady v.
Maryland"' instituted a modest use of this approach in the crimi-
nal context; the Supreme Court obliged prosecutors to make excul-
patory information available to the defense. However, of late the
Court has retreated dramatically from Brady and has refused to
enforce the prosecution's obligations to provide exculpatory infor-
mation.1 2 In essence, the Court has only sparingly used informa-
tion exchange or state-funded information creation as techniques
for diminishing the imbalance between government and its
opponents.
To summarize, placing faith in lawyer-based, adjudicatory.
procedure makes some sense when there is a shared perception
that the adversaries have the ability to compete. Game metaphors
are plausible in the context of fairly-matched teams."" Upon a rec-
able to cut the LSC budget by more than one-third. Abel, supra note 105, at 533.
I" See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 440 (1983) (attorney's fee awards related to
degree of success on particular claims); Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. 3012 (1985), discussed
infra at text accompanying notes 166-72; Evans v. Jeff D., 106 S. Ct. 1531 (1986), discussed
infra at text accompanying notes 173-74.
10, Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1981); see also Ake v. Oklahoma, 105 S. Ct.
1087, 1099 (1985) (requiring provision of pi3clliatic assistance to aid accusd, io. imeets- ..
specified criteria, in putting forward insanity defense).
110 See, e.g., California v. Trombetta, 104 S. Ct. 2528, 2535 (1984) (no requirement that
state preserve breath samples of allegedly intoxicated drivers).
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). The German mode of procedure may offer a parallel poten-
tial and such a prospect would be one of the attractions of that system. See Langbein, supra
note 44, at 826-29.
" See United States v. Bagley, 105 S. Ct. 3375, 3384 (1985), discussed infra at text
accompanying notes 179-80; United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112-14 (1976) (imposing a
materiality standard).
213 See Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assis-
tance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1133, 1163 (1982).
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ognition of widespread imbalance (and particularly of frequent dis-
putes between government and the poor), parity is required to sus-
tain belief in adversarialism. Thus far, neither the Court nor the
Congress has been willing to translate fully the rhetoric of adver-
sarialism into actuality by mandating resource supplements.
The entry of impoverished litigants into the federal courts was
not the only change that made problematic the process-based
rights announced by the Court and the values of the Federal Rules.
The kinds of cases filed by adequately equipped (and perhaps
over-equipped) litigants have become increasingly complex. The
more narrow confines of the nineteen-thirties paradigm have been
enlarged; the 1938 Rules encompass (and enable) more sprawling
disputes. Instead of asking, Did Smith cause harm to Jones (by
breach of contract or by negligent action)? federal courts today ad-
dress such questions as, Did a pattern of behavior engaged in by a
corporation over a six-year period constitute employment discrimi-
nation? Did an industry breach its duty by failing to warn workers
of hazardous conditions that developed over a decade? Did a group
of entities and individuals conspire to limit competition within a
market the boundaries of which are themselves difficult to
describe?
Of course, many cases still involve relatively discrete retro-
spective evaluations of specific events. The federal courts have
thousands of so-called "ordinary" cases in which parties, lawyers,
and judges invest little or no time. Approximately half the cases in
federal court involve little or no discovery,114 and the overwhelm-
ing majority of disputes are withdrawn, settled, or decided before
trial. 1 5 Further, complex cases are by no means a new phenome-
114 See P. CONNOLLY, E. HoLLEMAN & M. KUHLMAN, JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL
LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DIscovERY 28 (1978) (approximately 52% of the surveyed cases had no
recorded discovery requests; 95.1% had 10 or fewer requests); Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner,
Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. Rv. 72, 90 (1983)
(reporting no evidence of discovery in half the studied cases) [hereinafter cited as Trubek];
Brooklyn Law School, Discovery Study Status Report 5 (Sept. 1985) (on file with The Uni-
versity of Chicago Law Review) (of 52 Eastern District of New York cases in original sam-
ple, only half involved any discovery at all); cf. Speck, The Use of Discovery in United
States District Courts, 60 YALE L.J. 1132, 1134 (1951) (concluding that discovery was "pop-
ular" on the basis of finding that discovery rules were used in over 25% of the cases).
I' See 1984 AiumnsTRATIvm OFFICE REPORT, suprh note 6, at 280 (only about 5% of
cases filed are tried); see also Trubek et al., supra note 114, at 86-87; cf. ALI Crvm CASES,
supra note 61, at 74 (1934 study reporting that only 9.2% of the liquor cases and 12.4% of
the non-liquor cases in a three-year period ending June 30, 1930 went to trial).
Despite the superficial impression that settlement rates have increased, historical com-
parisons of the rates are not possible on the basis of these data. Before the 1938 Federal
Rules, some cases were commenced and concluded without the filing of any documents with
[53:494
1986] Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline
non; the federal courts have long been engaged in dealing with
multi-party, multi-issue disputes, such as bankruptcy proceed-
ings."' But there appears to have been a shift in the prevalence
and visibility of complicated cases; we hear and know a good deal
more about the complex side of the federal docket, and signs of
distress about that side are evident. The pretrial process in these
cases can be extensive and burdensome, 117 and in the five percent
of the cases tried, the trials take longer than they had in the
past." 8
Some of the changes in perception and reality must be attrib-
uted to the Federal Rules themselves, which enable both complex-
ity and visibility. The 1938 Rules deliberately liberalized joinder
practice; as the drafters discuss it, the idea was to permit a com-
plete and thorough airing of a dispute and then to conclude it once
and for all. 19 But the perceptions of the boundaries of a dispute
have themselves changed with that liberalization and with the
merger of law and equity; the number of claims and parties that
can fall within the Rules has impressed some with the need to ad-
vocate retrenchment. Further, the 1966 amendments to the Fed-
eral Rules worked major changes in both group litigation and
a court, see infra note 121 and accompanying text. As a consequence, we cannot know what
percentage of all the disputes we would count as "cases" today were settled or withdrawn in
the 1930s. For analysis of two rural counties' dockets that suggests no decline in trial rates
over time, see Daniels, Continuity and Change in Patterns of Case Handling: A Case Study
of Two Rural Counties, 19 L. & Soc'v REV. 381, 417 (1985).
"1 See Eisenberg & Yeazell, The Ordinary and the Extraordinary in Institutional Lit-
igation, 93 HARv. L. REv. 465, 485-86 (1980).
17 See, for example, the description of "the discovery travail" in In re Professional
Hockey Antitrust Litigation, 63 F.R.D. 641, 643 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (dismissing suit with
prejudice for failure to answer interrogatories), rev'd, 531 F.2d 1188 (3d Cir.) (rejecting dis-
missal sanction), rev'd sub nom. National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427
U.S. 639 (1976) (per curiam) (holding that dismissal was not an abuse of discretion). See
generally Rosenberg & King, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough is
Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REv. 579.
11 In 1945, 59.1% of the civil trials (both jury and bench) were completed in one day
or less, 9.9% in 4 to 9 days, and 0.8% in 10 or more days. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR 100 (1945) [hereinafter cited as
1945 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE REPORT]. In 1984, 46% of the civil trials were completed in one
day or less, 19% in 4 to 9 days, and 3% in more than 10 days. 1984 ADMNISTRATIVE OFFICE
REPORT, supra note 6, at 302 (extrapolated). Further, because during the same period the
percentages of civil cases tried decreased from 13.5% in 1945 to 5% in 1984, the cumulative
impression of the prevalance of longer trials has been enhanced. See 1945 ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE REPORT, supra, at 49 (excluding cases brought by Office of Price Administration) and
1984 ADMINISTRATrvE OFFICE REPORT, supra note 6, at 152. See Appendix B.
'" See Dobie, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 VA. L. REV. 261, 267-68, 270-
74, 283 (1939). For discussion of the views underlying the work in this period, see R. Bone's
forthcoming article on the right, interests, and functional approaches of the rulemakers.
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third-party practice. The revision of the class action rule has ena-
bled diverse sets of individuals to present themselves as groups to
the federal courts and has prompted extensive consideration of
when representative litigation is permissible.120
The Rules also have done much to redefine the interdepen-
dent roles of judges and attorneys. Before 1938, some localities ap-
parently operated on the "hip pocket" system. Lawsuits "com-
menced" by the service of the complaint upon one's opponent. No
documents were filed with the court until and unless some request
was made to the court.121 In contrast, the 1938 Rules required that
every lawsuit be "commenced" by the filing of a complaint with
the court;122 as a consequence, all pretrial activities must now oc-
cur under the umbrella of the court. Of course, in 1938 as today,
many cases were terminated by voluntary agreement or by with-
drawal.1 23 But by requiring the filing of the case and then by creat-
ing a "revolutionary" (as one of the drafters termed it) system of
pretrial rights-to wit, discovery 124-the 1938 Rules enabled the
development of a new set of activities and new conditions for the
interaction of judge and lawyer. With the new procedural opportu-
nities came a new set of lawyers, "litigators," who did their work
(motions, deposition and interrogatory practice) during the pretrial
process and who were to be distinguished from "trial lawyers," who
actually conducted trials.125 In short, the 1938 Rules enabled us to
understand what was known but not fully appreciated-that in
most cases, the pretrial was all there was. In addition, the 1938
Rules enabled us to become aware of a host of attorneys' adver-
sarial practices not previously within ready view of either judges or
the public.126 Coupled with the shift from a master calendar to an
120 See Yeazell, From Group Litigation to Class Action, Part II: Interest, Class, and
Representation, 27 UCLA L. REv. 1067, 1107-20 (1980) (discussing Rule 23's confusion
about when consent by the members of the class is required).
11 The drafters considered but rejected the "hip pocket" system. See 2 J. MooRE, J.
LucAs, H. FINK & C. THOMpsoN, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTc. 3.03, at 3-12 (2d ed. 1985); 1
P. EDMUNDS, supra note 9, at 113-14. For a defense of that system, see Advisory Committee
of Western District of New York, Rules of Procedure for District Courts, 9 N.Y. ST. BA
BULL. 268, 268 (1937) ("An action should be commenced by the simple issuance of a sum-
mons by the plaintiff or his attorney, and its service, without the necessity of filing a com-
plaint.... [S]ervice of a summons [by itself] often brings about the settlement of a just
claim.").
2 FED. R. Civ. P. 3. Rule 3 "does not affect [the tolling of] state statutes of limita-
tions." Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 751 (1980).
122 See supra note 115.
12:4 Dobie, supra note 119, at 275.
120 Levy, Discovery-Use, and Abuse, Myth and Reality, 17 FORUM 465, 470 (1981).
128 Some of the contemporary writers seemed to think that discovery would be a vehi-
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individual calendar system 127 and with fee-shifting statutes regu-
lated by judges,128 the Rule changes permitted federal judges to
become familiar with the practices of specific lawyers in particular
cases.
Much of what judges (and to a lesser extent, the public) have
seen during the pretrial period has led to substantial consterna-
tion.129 The increased visibility of adversarial behavior has re-
vealed practices that make faith in its output problematic. First,
judges have a heightened awareness of the uneven quality of attor-
neys; one motivation for managerial judging is a concern that,
without judicial "guidance," attorneys may grievously disserve
their clients' interests. A second concern comes under the code
word "abuse"; the perception is that, by demanding too much or
providing too little, attorneys waste the resources of clients and of
the courts. 30 Third, there is a growing awareness of the "big
cle for diminishing inappropriate adversarial activity. See Holtzoff, supra note 87, at 205
(the objectives of the new federal rules include the "elimination of the 'sporting theory' of
justice").
1" The influence of the individual calendar system has been profound, for it has linked
judges to their caseloads and has thus created different understandings of what "good"
judges accomplish. See MAURIMN SOLOMON, CASanOW MANAGEMENT IN TRuIL COURT 9
(1973) (suggesting that the calendar system creates a competitive atmosphere that motivates
active case management); Chief Judge Motley Describes Court, Career; Reflects on Na-
tional Impact of Landmark Cases, THRD BRANCH, Dec. 1985, at 1, 6 [hereinafter cited as
Motley Interview] ("[T]he single-judge calendar system is the greatest invention since the
wheel .... [H]aving an individual calendar system is the incentive for everybody to keep
working so that he is not the last man on the totem pole.").
11 Fee applications have told us a good deal about attorneys' practices. See Report of
the Third Circuit Task Force, Court Awarded Attorney Fees, 108 F.R.D. 237 (1985); Leub-
sdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBS. 9, 31-36 (1984) (discussing the impact of fee shifting).
" See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 754-57 & n.4 (1980)
(describing conduct leading to decision to tax attorney's fees directly against counsel);
Miller, The Adversary System: Dinosaur or Phoenix, 69 MINN. L. Rav. 1, 8-16 (1984); Note,
The Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91 HAav.
L. REv. 1033, 1044-45 (1978).
130 Documenting the frequency (rather than the visibility) of attorney misbehavior is
very difficult. See Brazil, Views from the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers
about the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 A. B. FouND. RESEARcH J. 217, 229 (attorneys
and judges indicate that discovery problems are prevalent only in the "subworld" of larger
cases).
Some of the distress about attorney behavior has worked its way into the Federal Rules.
See, for example, the 1980 amendment to Rule 34, which governs the production of docu-
ments. The rule was amended to require that documents be presented in the order in which
they are kept or in the order requested by the opposing counsel. The following explanation
is dryly offered: "The Committee is advised that, 'It is apparently not rare for parties delib-
erately to mix critical documents with others in the hopes of obscuring significance."' FED.
R Civ. P. 34, Note to 1980 Amendment (quoting Section of Litigation of the American Bar
Association, Report of the Special Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse 22 (1977)).
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spenders," clients with seemingly unbounded resources who can
purchase attorney services to fuel unending battles. Finally, be-
cause of fee submissions, the precise dollar translations of all attor-
ney behavior (good and bad) can now be made.
Are lawyers today qualitatively different from those who prac-
ticed fifty years ago? Although there was a tendency to attribute
such malfeasance to "New York" lawyers, the drafters of the Fed-
eral Rules were aware of "sharp" practices and attorney inepti-
tude. 131 But the current literature appears to contain an unending
number of complaints against lawyers. Today's rule drafters seem
to have more reservations about the utility of adversarial modes of
interaction than did their counterparts fifty years ago. Explana-
tions for this change in the rhetoric are varied. Perhaps "gentle-
manly lawyers" did in fact behave differently fifty years ago than
do their contemporary counterparts. 13 2 Perhaps the behavior of at-
torneys has remained relatively consistent, but the individuals
harmed by attorney malfeasance have changed. Then, as now, in-
ept or dishonest lawyers harmed clients a good deal. Only occa-
sionally, however, was attorney misbehavior a problem for a judge,
who had to hear a poorly prepared motion or supervise a badly
orchestrated trial. But today, as cases have become more complex
and pretrial preparation has become court-centered, attorney mis-
behavior is likely to be a problem for judges, who depend upon
attorneys to simplify and to clarify issues. When attorneys fail,
judges suffer. Further, judges who perceive themselves as over-
worked may become impatient with too many nuances and may
express dismay at what is, in fact, good lawyering. In short, today
the judge's ox is sometimes gored by attorney behavior; as a conse-
quence, many judges actively attempt to supervise attorneys.
Finally, during the past fifty years, a host of new, quasi-adju-
dicatory bodies-agencies-have flourished and now dot the land-
scape of dispute resolution. Virtually since the inception of the
United States, federal courts have not been the exclusive venue for
More recent amendments to Rule 11 (governing certification of documents) and to Rule 26
(concerning discovery) also acknowledge the potential for attorney overreaching and permit
judges to impose sanctions directly on attorneys. See Order Amending Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 461 U.S. 1097 (1983).
"' Clark, The Bar, supra note 26, at 23; see also Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 511
(1947) (work product protection necessary to insure against "sharp practices"); E. MORGAN,
supra note 82, at 32 ("The success or failure of any procedural device depends upon the
judges and lawyers ... using it.").
132 Cf. Genego, Risky Business-The Hazards of Being a Private Criminal Defense
Lawyer, 1 CraM. JusT. 2, 39-40 (1986) (survey of the increased use of harassing tactics by
federal prosecutors).
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federal adjudication, s but their claim of uniqueness has dimin-
ished over the past five decades. Agencies now preside over a vast
proportion of the factfinding within the federal system.3 4 When
the drafters of the 1938 Federal Rules worked, there seemed to be
an unstated assumption that there was an arena of court-based ac-
tivity that could be readily delineated. Today, the line that they
may have assumed has become quite blurred-in both directions.
Federal courts have required agencies to act a good deal more like
courts, to provide "due process" by conducting their business
much in the manner of a court. Moreover, federal courts have
themselves become more dependent upon non-Article III actors,
such as bankruptcy judges and magistrates, to dispose of much of
the federal courts' own docket.3 5 The Supreme Court's recent dif-
ficulties in articulating what powers Congress cannot, constitution-
ally, bestow upon non-Article III actors bespeak the complexity of
delineating judge from non-judge.13 6
To summarize, in the past fifty (and particularly in the past
twenty) years, the docket of the federal courts has changed in sev-
eral significant ways. First and foremost in the minds of many ju-
rists,13 7 there are a lot more cases to decide. 3 8 Second, some of
133 See American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828) (territorial courts
permissible). See generally Resnik, The Mythic Meaning of Article III Courts, 56 U. COLO.
L. REv. 581 (1983) (discussing the growth of non-Article IH adjudication); Comment, The
Boundaries of Article III: Delegation of Final Decisionmaking Authority to Magistrates, 52
U. CHL L. REV. 1032, 1038-48 (1985) (discussing the permissible exercises of power by non-
Article Il actors).
134 As of June 1984, Article Il courts had 250,962 civil actions pending. 1984 ADmms-
TRATION OFFICE REPORT, supra note 6, at 124. By comparison, the Social Security Adminis-
tration alone made 337,459 dispositions. SocIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, US. DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, OPERATIONAL REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF HEARINGS AND Ap-
PEALS 26 (Sept. 30, 1984).
13' For a discussion of the delegation of work to magistrates, see CARROLL SERON, THE
ROLES OF MAGISTRATES: NINE CASE STUDIES (1985).
134 See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982);
Resnik, supra note 133, at 597-603 (1985).
137 Discussions of statistics and dispositions dominate much of the federal judiciary's
commentary. See, e.g., Motley Interview, supra note 127, at 6 (major shift in last twenty
years is the increase in litigation).
1" In 1945, the number of civil cases commenced was 60,965. 1945 ADMINISTRATIE OF-
FiCE REPORT, supra note 118, at 82. In 1984, the number of civil cases commenced was
261,485. 1984 ADMINISTRATwE OFFICE REPORT, supra note 6, at 249. Of course, the number of
judgeships has increased. But the number of filings per judge has also increased. In 1945
there were approximately 336 civil filings per judge-a figure derived from taking the num-
ber of civil cases commenced in that year, see 1945 ADMINISTRATIvE OFFICE REPORT, supra
note 118, at 83, and dividing by the 181 district court judges active at that time, see 61 F.
Supp. vii, vii-xiv (1945) (listing of judges). In 1984, there were 508 civil filings per judge.
1984 ADMImSTRATIVE OFFICE REPORT, supra note 6, at 129 (filings per authorized judgeship).
Note that these data do not decide the "litigation explosion" question; information on filing
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those cases involve disputes between the very powerful (often but
not exclusively the government) and the very poor. Third, new fed-
eral legislation has served as the basis for complex cases in which
the underlying disputes may involve multiple incidents and require
the production of numerous witnesses and thousands of docu-
ments.139 Fourth, an important set of cases involves group litiga-
tion, in which representatives seek recognition to pursue the rights
of individuals not physically before the court and sometimes not
even aware of the pendency of the lawsuit. Fifth, in those cases in
which court-based activity actually occurs, the litigation is some-
times protracted and complex, and the opportunities for adversari-
alism in the pretrial process or at trial are multiplied. Sixth, be-
cause that adversarialism occurs under the umbrella of the court-
based discovery rights established by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and in the context of an individual calendar system and
fee-shifting statutes, judges see a good deal of aggressive or inept
attorneys. Finally, many other institutions within the society have
been obligated to perform court-like functions in a court-like man-
ner, and the growing use of such alternatives raises questions about
the appropriate domain of the federal courts. 40
III. FAILING FAITH
These changes have not gone unnoticed by today's drafters of
the Federal Rules. Several inroads have been made in some of the
decisions of the 1938 group. First, the premise of trans-substantive
rules has been silently undermined-de jure and de facto. At a for-
mal level, the Court has promulgated special rules for the litigation
of prisoners' habeas corpus cases."1 In addition, the recently re-
rates as contrasted with population size is not included in the Administrative Office's data.
139 Such cases also make problematic the delineation between questions of fact and
questions of law. Thus far, the Supreme Court has not been sensitive to these complexities.
See, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 285-90 (1982) (treating discriminatory
motive as a question of "fact" when the Court delineated the proper scope of appellate
review); see also Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 837, 998-1005 (1984) (critiquing Pullman-
Standard).
14' The question of what is "court-like" is more complex than this sentence indicates.
It may well be that our current understanding of "adjudication" will not last the century,
and that subsequent commentators will understand a different configuration of activities as
belonging to courts. See Schwartz, The Other Things That Courts Do, 28 UCLA L. REv. 438
(1981).
141 Order Promulgating Rules Governing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Cases in the U.S. District
Courts and Rules Governing 28 U.S.C § 2255 Proceedings for the U.S. District Courts, 425
U.S. 1169 (1976). Some of these rules were modified by Congress. See Pub. L. No. 94-426,
§§ 1-2, 90 Stat. 1334 (1976); Pub. L. No. 94-577, § 2, 90 Stat. 2730 (1976). See generally
Clinton, Rule 9 of the Federal Habeas Corpus Rules: A Case Study on the Need for Reform
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vised Manual for Complex Litigation has created a distinct set of
rules for cases with multiple parties or complex issues. 42 At an in-
formal level, the emergence of managerial judging143 and the ap-
proval of that phenomenon in the 1983 amendments to Rule 16
(governing pretrial procedures) 1' exemplify ad hoc efforts to tailor
rules to individual cases. As other papers in this symposium detail,
judges and lawyers across the country are busily creating new pro-
cedures for different kinds of cases."45 The zeal of many of the ad-
vocates of such efforts4 6 underscores their judgment that trans-
substantive rules are often inadequate.
Second, the silence of the original Rules about appropriate at-
torney behavior has been modified to some extent by the expan-
sion of judicial authority to impose sanctions upon attorneys. The
1983 amendments to Rules 11 and 26, and the emerging commen-
tary and case law concerning those amendments,"47 evidence a new
willingness by judges to describe the permissible scope of adver-
sarialism"" and to curtail unbridled aggression. Further, judges
have been forced to contemplate the validity of the assumption
that the attorney and client are a "moral unit."" 9 Attorney sanc-
of the Rules Enabling Acts, 63 IowA L. REv. 15 (1977).
141 MANuAL FOR CoMPLEx LITIGATION, SECOND (1985). In addition to discussing gener-
ally applicable techniques, the Manual suggests methods for handling particular types of
cases: antitrust (§ 33.1), complex tort cases (§ 33.2), securities litigation (§ 33.3), takeover
litigation (§ 33.4), employment discrimination litigation (§ 33.5), and patent litigation
(§ 33.6).
143 See Resnik, supra note 17, at 391-400.
" Under Rule 16 of the Federal Rules, the judge is to approve a schedule for pretrial
events and to discuss settlement when appropriate.
145 See Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciary or Re-
shaping Adjudication?, 53 U. CHL L. REV. 394 (1986); Lieberman & Henry, Lessons from
ADR, 53 U. CHL L. RE V. 424 (1986); McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach For Manag-
ing Complex Litigation, 53 U. CHL L. REv. 440 (1986); Posner, The Summary Jury Trial
and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53
U. CHL L. Rav. 366 (1986).
146 See Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute
Resolution, 103 F.R.D. 461 (1984); Larnbros & Shunk, The Summary Jury Trial, 29 CLEv.
ST. L. REV. 43 (1980).
M See, e.g., Schwarzer, Sanctions under the New Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look,
104 F.R.D. 181, 183-84 (1985); Strasser, Sanctions: A Sword is Sharpened, Nat'l Law J.,
Nov. 11, 1985, at 1, col. 2 (law firms across the country report imposition by judges of large
monetary sanctions).
1 4 See U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York, Standing Orders of
the Court on Effective Discovery in Civil Cases, 1984, in 2 LOCAL COURT RULas, supra note
4; Revised Report of the Special Committee on Effective Discovery in Civil Cases for the
Eastern District of New York (1983) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review)
(effort by Chief Judge Jack Weinstein and an advisory committee to delineate appropriate
interaction during discovery).
149 Cover & Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE
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tions (in addition to or instead of client sanctions) are now in
vogue.150
Third, the quiet reference in the 1983 amendments to the pro-
priety of court involvement in settlement efforts, 5' coupled with
the ongoing discussion about fee-shifting as a sanction for failure
to settle,15 2 indicate a new emphasis on settlement. Many federal
judges have begun to perceive themselves as being in the business
of settlement as much as (sometimes more than) in the business of
adjudication. 5 ' Other actors have entered the marketplace of dis-
pute resolution and are now hawking their wares to federal judges
and to the academic community.' Many of these enterprises ad-
vertise themselves as facilitating settlement-not adjudica-
tion"'5 -and aim to "educate" the federal judiciary on the advisa-
bility of shifting dispute resolution to "alternative" spheres. 56
Federal judges, not so clear on the definition of what they (in con-
L.J. 1035, 1042 (1977).
150 See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 96-349, § 3, 94 Stat. 1156 (1980) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 1927)
(making counsel "personally" liable for excess costs, including attorney's fees, due to unrea-
sonable and vexatious litigation); Fpm. R Civ. P. 11 (sanctions for signing papers without
requisite good faith basis for allegations or arguments); FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (sanctions for
discovery activities). See generally Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Questions About Power, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV.
997 (1983).
151 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a) now authorizes the district court to require a conference for,
among other things, "facilitating the settlement of the case."
152 For descriptions of recent proposals to amend Rule 68 to authorize sanctions for
"unreasonably" refusing to settle, see Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. 3012, 3033-34 & nn.56-58
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference of the U.S., Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 98 F.R.D 339, 361-67 (1983) (proposed rule and committee note); Comm.
on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., Proposed Court
Rules, 102 F.R.D. 407, 432-37 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Court Rules] (later ver-
sion of proposed rule and committee note). For discussion of the problems raised by Marek,
see Macklin, Promoting Settlement, Forgoing the Facts, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHAGE
1201 (1986).
151 But cf. Trends in Federal Law and Procedure, 5 F.R.D. 361, 364 (1946) (discussion
by Judge Moskovitz: "[J]udges conducting pretrial conferences should be careful not to give
the impression of advocating that the attorneys settle the matter .... [A] suggestion to the
attorneys that they discuss the possibilities of settlement should be the limit of impetus
from the court.").
25 See, e.g., Tan Mm-TRIAL WORKBOOK (Center for Public Resources 1985); ADR
Manual, supra note 13; Gordon, You, Too, Can Stay Out of Court, L. A. Daily J., Sept. 20,
1985, at 4 (discussing EnDispute).
155 E.g., Green, Growth of the Mini-Trial, LrrGATION, Fall 1982, at 12 (mini-trial as a
"powerful new technique for settling complex civil cases").
15" See Peckham, A Judicial Response to the Cost of Litigation: Case Management,
Two-Stage Discovery Planning and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 37 RUTGERS L. REV.
235, 267-77 & n.93 (1985) (description of the educational efforts of private groups and of the
alternatives available).
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trast to other dispute resolution centers) do, have evidenced a will-
ingness to incorporate new responses to the lawsuits pending
before them.
These changes might be understood as evolutionary adapta-
tions of the 1938 Rules to contemporary problems.157 Further, our
history is replete with periodic, intense complaints about the "ad-
ministration of justice," and the nineteen-eighties might be one
such moment. Our perceptions of its import may be distorted. But
the recitation of the changes does not quite capture the tenor of
the discussions of the last decade about federal procedure; the
Rule revisions and the current proposals reflect deep dissatisfac-
tion with some of the beliefs embodied in the 1938 draft. The dom-
inant claim today is that the framework has provided too many
opportunities for exploitation and manipulation and too little
guidance for the untutored. Many of the calls for reform seek to
contract the occasions upon which procedure could be used-either
by shortening the time between filing and disposition or by elimi-
nating some of the procedural options. A justification often offered
is, essentially, that "less is more," that fewer procedural opportuni-
ties will beget more dispositions and that more dispositions are in-
herently desirable. 158 The utility of adjudication is now implicitly
questioned.
I believe that the pressures to produce outcomes, coupled with
first-hand experiences of seemingly illogical results rendered after
extensive adversarial parrying by apparently unbridled attorneys,
have generated the emerging cynicism. If outcomes after trial or
other forms of adjudication cannot, systematically and in the ag-
gregate, be demonstrated (or at least felt) to be better than out-
comes produced with little or no process, if attorney misbehavior
and incompetence are widespread, if the adversarial model is ap-
plied in settings which render it farcical, why insist upon formal
procedure? Why not just produce inexpensive outcomes by arriv-
ing at settlements as quickly as possible? Why not give courts a
large arsenal by which to urge, even to force, settlements? Why
search for legitimacy in formal procedure? As federal judges self-
consciously shift roles from adjudicator to case-manager to settler,
157 See Elliott, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHL L. REV.
306 (1986). But see Subrin, supra note 31, at 1649-51 (arguing that judicial management
deviates from the four central presumptions of the drafters of the 1938 Rules).
I" See Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 YALE
L.J. 1643, 1652 (1985) (arguing that we can no longer afford to "retain any procedure that
could conceivably increase the likelihood of a fair result" because procedure leads to delay
and the "consequent loss of fairness to all others affected by the litigation process.").
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as judges call for the increased use of summary judgment 159 and for
other quick solutions, judges demonstrate their own sense of the
marginal utility-and perhaps of the futility-of full-blown
adjudication.
There are many examples of this failing faith. On the civil
side, recent Supreme Court cases display the majority's willingness
to press for dispositions, no matter what the procedure. One exam-
ple is the veterans benefits case, Walters v. National Association
of Radiation Survivors.'60 In Walters, a federal district court had
issued a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of a stat-
ute, dating from 1866, which prohibited attorneys representing vet-
erans before the Veterans Administration from charging more than
ten dollars per case."6' Apparently, the fee had not functioned as a
bar to representation by attorneys at the time of its enactment,
but by the nineteen-eighties, the fee effectively precluded attor-
neys from appearing. 162 While acknowledging the complexity of
some of the cases in which representation was sought, the Court
(by Justice Rehnquist) reversed the injunction and upheld the
statute as constitutional against both first and fifth amendment
challenges. 6 ' The Court's hostility to lawyers and to the proce-
dures they engender is palpable:
It is scarcely open to doubt that if claimants were permitted
to retain compensated attorneys the day might come when it
could be said that an attorney might indeed be necessary to
present a claim properly in a system rendered more adversary
and more complex by the very presence of lawyer
representation.'6"
Simplicity and nonadversarial exchanges have enormous appeal,
but it is difficult to find them in the interaction between veteran
and bureaucracy. According to studies cited by the Court, the Vet-
159 See, e.g., Schwarzer, supra note 30.
160 105 S. Ct. 3180 (1985).
161 38 U.S.C. § 3404(c)(2) (1983).
162 105 S. Ct. at 3210 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[I]n terms of the average serviceman's
base pay, a $10 fee then was roughly the equivalent of a $580 fee today.").
163 Id. at 3196-97.
164 Id. at 3192. This comment is reminiscent of an earlier remark by the Chief Justice
that what "the juvenile court system needs is not more but less of the trappings of legal
procedure and judicial formalism." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 376 (1970) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (opposing requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in juvenile commit-
ment proceedings). Of course, the Court is ambivalent towards lawyers. Cf. Zauderer v. Of-
fice of Disciplinary Counsel, 105 S. Ct. 2265, 2278 (1985) (White, J.) ("[W]e cannot endorse
the proposition that a lawsuit, as such, is an evil.").
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erans Administration processed more than 800,000 claims a
year-almost half of which were disallowed at the initial
proceeding.16 5
A second case is Marek v. Chesny.'66 The question in Marek
was the relationship between the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fee Act
of 1976187 and the breadth of the sanction provided in the 1938
Federal Rules for failure to settle. As interpreted previously by the
Supreme Court, rule 68 provides that a plaintiff (but not a defend-
ant) who refuses a timely, written settlement offer may be taxed
"costs" from the date of the offer if a victory at trial is less than
the offered settlement. 6 ' At issue in Marek was the definition of
the word "costs"; could "attorneys' fees," described in some federal
legislation (including the Civil Rights Fee Act) as taxable "as part
of the costs,"1 69 be a part of the "costs" referred to under rule 68?
Could a defendant in a civil rights case no longer be liable for a
victorious plaintiff's attorneys' fees incurred after a rule 68 offer
when the plaintiff recovered a judgment less than the offer? Could
such a reading be squared with the Civil Rights Fee Act, which
provides a one-way shift from defendants to prevailing plaintiffs to
encourage civil rights filings (understood as enforcing public pol-
icy)? Writing for the majority, the Chief Justice (long a proponent
of increased sanctions for failure to settle) answered in the affirma-
tive. "To be sure, application of Rule 68 to include attorneys' fees
. . . will require plaintiffs to think very hard about whether con-
tinued litigation is worthwhile,"170 but "encourag[ing] settlements"
is the point.171 The majority in Marek insisted that its reading of
the rule was "neutral." But the rule operates in a world already
full of social inequality. By definition, civil rights plaintiffs chal-
lenge state action; by implication, many of those cases involve
plaintiffs with vastly fewer resources than defendants possess. The
Court's reading ignored the complexity of the disparate impact
that the increase in economic incentives to settle has upon litigants
with vastly divergent resources.1 72 Marek exemplifies the willing-
145 105 S. Ct. at 3183.
166 105 S. Ct. 3012 (1985).
267 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
1" Delta Air Lines v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 352 (1981).
"I See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982), construed in Marek, 105 S. Ct. at 3015.
170 105 S. Ct. at 3018.
1" Id.
172 See Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alterna-
tive Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STuD. 55, 63-69 (1982); Bone,
Brennan, Chemerinsky, Curtis, Genego, Ragsdale & Resnik, Comments on Proposals to
Amend the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Submitted to the Advisory Committee to the
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ness of jurists to increase the pressures upon litigants to bail out.
This past term, the focus shifted from client to lawyer. In Ev-
ans v. Jeff D.,173 the Court again evidenced its ambivalence, if not
hostility, towards trial as a method of decisionmaking. Like Marek,
Evans addressed the question of the relationship between the Civil
Rights Attorneys' Fee Act and a Federal Rule, this time 23(e),
which prohibits the dismissal or compromise of class actions with-
out court approval. In Evans, the Court permitted district court
endorsements of settlements that were conditioned upon the
waiver of fees by plaintiffs' lawyers; once again, the Court limited
the impact of the Civil Rights Fee Act by enhancing "the attrac-
tiveness of settlement."174 Attorneys who have been willing to re-
present civil rights plaintiffs in the hopes of recovering fees will
now have to pause before making such investments. 17 5 Presumably,
the number of civil rights filings will be reduced, as will the already
small percentage of cases tried.
On the criminal and administrative sides of the docket, paral-
lel illustrations of the anti-adjudication posture are easily identi-
fied. Most criminal decisionmaking occurs through the settlement
process-plea bargaining. Criticism of plea bargaining comes from
prosecution, defense, and the judiciary; no one much likes the sys-
tem but no one wants to pay for the alternative-adjudication.1 7 6
At any point in the criminal process, adjudication is resisted. Thus,
when defense advocates seek to require factfinding to determine
degrees of culpability at sentencing or parole, their efforts are
rebuffed; there is great reluctance to require factfinding hearings
or many of the other rights associated with adjudication.17 7 In-
Standing Committee of the Judicial Conference on Rules of Practice and Procedure in the
United States Courts (1985) [hereinafter cited as USC Law Professors' Testimony] (on file
with The University of Chicago Law Review).
173 106 S. Ct. 1531 (1986).
174 Id. at 1540.
I'l Compare the approach of the Third Circuit in Prandini v. National Tea Co., 557
F.2d 1015, 1017 (1977) (banning simultaneous negotiations of the merits and of attorneys'
fees to minimize the conflicts between client and lawyer).
1' See Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant's Right to Trial: Alternatives
to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CH. L. REv. 931, 935 (1983).
277 An example of this was Judge Weinstein's effort, rebuffed by the Second Circuit, to
import evidentiary norms into the sentencing process. See United States v. Fatico, 441 F.
Supp. 1285 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd, 579 F.2d 707 (2d Cir.), on remand, 458 F. Supp. 388
(E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd in part, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 1073
(1980); see also United States v. Napolitano, 761 F.2d 135, 138-39 (2d Cir. 1985) (permitting
use of hearsay at sentencing hearing), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 129 (1985); United States v.
Papajohn, 701 F.2d 760 (8th Cir. 1983) (trial judge has broad discretion in conduct of
presentence hearing).
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stead, judges, parole examiners, and other government officials are
left to rely upon hearsay comments made by prosecutors and
found in agency files. These decisionmakers reach judgments based
upon minimal standards of proof. Pressing for procedural formality
undermines the economies of the disposition-oriented mode.178
Further, in the few criminal cases that are tried, the decisions
reached have impressive durability; harmless error doctrine has
grown and enforcement of criminal defendants' rights has dimin-
ished. The recent evisceration of the Brady v. Maryland require-
ment that prosecutors provide exculpatory evidence to defendants
underscores the distance between the adjudicatory premises of the
past decades and the current acceptance of a disposition-oriented
system. In United States v. Bagley, defense counsel had specifi-
cally requested disclosures about whether witness-informants were
paid by the government.179 The information was not provided; the
defendant was convicted, and subsequently, via a Freedom of In-
formation Act request, documents were obtained establishing the
government contract with and payment of the informants. How-
ever, the Supreme Court declined to penalize the government for
its refusal to respect its Brady commitments.180 Bagley is part of a
larger picture of the curtailment of habeas corpus litigation"8 1 and
of the increased finality of first-tier decisions in non-criminal con-
texts as well.18 2 Once an outcome is obtained, it has become in-
creasingly difficult to revise it.
In the administrative and rulemaking contexts, the story is
similar. Goldberg v. Kelly has been understood narrowly as the
Court has praised the virtues of informality and has declined to
require more stylized adjudicatory encounters.' What Goldberg
178 In the federal system, sentences have typically been determined by judges who had
not participated in the bargaining process. See Curtis, Federal Judicial Power, Parole
Guidelines, and Sentence Reform, in 2 PRisoNERs' RIGHTS SOuRcFaoo, supra note 78, at
97-98. However, the recently-revised Federal Criminal Code will, when it,becomes effective,
require judges to articulate reasons for sentences-obliging some form of judicial factfinding
as a predicate to sentencing. See Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-
473, tit. 2, 98 Stat. 1837 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3351-3358). If this quasi-adjudication
requirement is enforced, an enormous number of factfinding hearings would be required.
:79 105 S. Ct. 3375 (1985).
180 See Babcock, supra note 113, at 1148-50.
181 See Resnik, supra note 139, at 874-962.
181 See id. at 982-1004.
'83 See, e.g., Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607-13 (1979) (no formal procedures for
commitment of child to state mental hospital); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 347-49
(1976) (no oral pretermination hearing required for disability benefits); see also Mashaw,
The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculus for Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v.
Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. Cm. L. Rav. 28 (1976).
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described in 1969 (perhaps in an advocacy mode) as "rudimentary
due process 18 4 has now become the high water mark. Further, Su-
preme Court pronouncements in cases are not the only evidence of
this antipathy to adjudicatory procedure. Recent rulemaking ef-
forts-including proposals to amend Rule 68 to give it more
"bite"-demonstrate the same impulses, 185 as do the speeches and
writings of federal judges, advocating less adjudication and more
reliance upon alternatives. s1 8
Two popular approaches-managerial judging and alternative
dispute resolution-further illustrate the declining interest in ad-
judication.187 Managerial judging employs the trial judge as a case
manager, moving a lawsuit from filing to disposition. While propo-
nents of managerial judging make occasional (and as yet undocu-
mented) claims that their activity produces better outcomes, the
primary justification advanced is economy. Managerial judging is
promoted as providing quicker, less expensive dispositions.88 Else-
where, I have indicated my skepticism about the proposition;"8 9 the
relevance of the phenomenon here is that the rhetoric of judging
has shifted from discussions of the difficulties of adjudication to
the need to increase case dispositions.1 90 Moreover, in the last few
18 Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 267.
188 See Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. 3012, 3032-35 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(describing proposed amendments); Simon, Rule 68 at the Crossroads: The Relationship
Between Offers of Judgment and Statutory Attorney's Fees, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 889, 893-94
(1984) (proposing expansion of rule 68). In 1986, the Advisory Committee voted to table the
proposal indefinitely. Letter from Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr., Chair of the Advisory Com-
mittee, to Professor Laura Macklin (May 19, 1986) (on file with The University of Chicago
Law Review).
186 See, e.g., Lambros, supra note 146, at 476-77; Newman, supra note 158, at 1644-45
(1985); Peckham, supra note 156, at 277.
187 These two approaches may not be two discrete phenomena but rather two varia-
tions on a single theme.
18 See FED. R. CIrv. P. 16, Advisory Committee Commentary to the 1983 Amendment
[hereinafter cited as Rule 16 Commentary] ("Empirical studies reveal that when a trial
judge intervenes personally at an early stage to assume judicial control over a case... the
case is disposed of... with less cost and delay than when the parties are left to their own
devices."); see also Flanders, Blind Umpires-A Response to Professor Resnik, 35 HAsT.
L.J. 505, 516-19 (1984) (providing data on disposition time); Peckham, supra note 156, at
277 ("case management ... can contain litigation costs"). For an attempt to link "econ-
omy" and "fairness," see Newman, supra note 158, at 1652.
18' See Resnik, supra note 17, at 417-31; see also Menkel-Meadow, For and Against
Settlement: Uses and Abuses of the Mandatory Settlement Conference, 33 UCLA L. REv.
485, 493-98 (1985) (data available do not support efficiency argument for judicial settlement
conferences).
190 For examples of earlier, loftier treatments of the judicial role, see Wyzanski, A Trial
Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1281, 1304 (1952), Yankwich, The
Art of Being a Judge, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 374, 388 (1957), and Devitt, Ten Commandments
for the New Judge, 47 ABA J. 1175 (1961).
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years, managerial judges have focused increasingly upon judicial
involvement in settlement.19' The attention paid to the judicial
settlement role clarifies one aspect of the impetus for increased
court control: the goals include constraining adversarial activity so
as to conclude cases without adjudication. The volume of case dis-
positions (rather than the substantive law in general, the merits of
a particular case, improved techniques for factfinding) has become
the be-all and end-all of many within the federal judiciary.
The attention paid to alternative dispute resolution (known in
the trade as ADR) is the other innovation demonstrating dimin-
ished interest in adjudication. 192 Ours is not the first generation to
be intrigued by responses to disputes other than adjudication by
judges. In colonial New York, there was talk of the use of arbitra-
tors;193 in the early nineteen-thirties, some judges urged their col-
leagues to consider the virtues of "conciliation"; 94 and during the
twenties and thirties, agency decisionmaking and arbitration were
seen as important alternatives to the expensive and difficult course
of litigation.'95 The current revival of interest in ADR comes, how-
ever, with a slight twist. In the past, while arbitration agree-
ments'96 and agency decisions were enforceable in court, 97 the "al-
ternative" activity itself occurred separate from the courthouse. 9 '
"I See D. MARIE PRovnI, SETTLEMENT STRATEGIES FOR FEDERAL DisTmcr JUDGES
(1986); Peckham, supra note 156, at 269-77; Resnik, supra note 17, at 421; see also Elliott,
supra note 157, at 323-26; Galanter, " . .A Settlement Judge, not a Trial Judge": Judicial
Mediation in the United States, 12 J.L. & Soc'Y 1, 2-3 (1985); Menkel-Meadow, supra note
189, at 486-90.
12 See generally Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Courts, 69 JuDICATURE 251
(1986); Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARv. L. REv.
668 (1986).
19 HENRY Sco'Ir, THE COURTS OF THE STATE OF NEW Yopxc THEm HISTORY, DEVELOP-
MENT AND JURISDICTION 43-44 (1909).
I" E.g., Randall, Conciliation as a Function of the Judge, 18 Ky. L.J. 330, 340 (1930).
195 See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 430-32 (1953) (arbitration); WALTER DODD, ADMIN-
ISTRATION OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 100-02 (1936); Comment, Judicial Review of Ad-
ministrative Findings-Crowell v. Benson, 41 YALE L.J. 1037 (1932) (arguing for limited
court review).
'" United States Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982). For applications of the
Act, see Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 105 S. Ct. 3346, 3355
(1985); Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 29 (1983); see
also Allison, Arbitration Agreements and Antitrust Claims: The Need for Enhanced Ac-
commodation of Conflicting Public Policies, 64 N.C.L. REv. 219 (1986); Atwood, Issues in
Federal-State Relations Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 37 U. FLA. L. REv. 61 (1985);
Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 71 VA.
L. REv. 1305 (1985).
M See, e.g., Longshoremen's & Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 921(d)
(1982); National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1982).
"' See Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 57 (1932) (Congress may not shift the "essential
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Arbitration and agency decisionmaking were understood to be
somewhat akin to, but also somehow distinct from, judicial deci-
sionmaking. Today, however, many involved with ADR advocate
that its methods be brought into the courthouse'99 and that judges
make ADR their own-either by sponsoring or by running it. 200 In
this respect, ADR (in the form of court-annexed arbitration, judi-
cial settlement conferences, summary jury' trials, and mediation)
offers not only an alternative to, but often a replacement for,
adjudication. 0 '
Judges have always engaged in activities other than formal ad-
judication. 2 But, over the past decade, there have been important
shifts in emphasis, frequency, and visibility of these aspects of the
judicial role. Moreover, as judges engage in or supervise the various
ADR processes, the line between adjudication and the other activi-
ties blurs. As noted above, both legislation and constitutional in-
terpretation have mandated adjudicatory modes for agen-
cies-blurring the line by making agencies behave more like courts.
Now the pressure is mounting from the other direction, as efforts
are made to convince judges to adopt less adjudicatory behaviors.
Because adjudication is, by definition, that which a judge does, the
effort to engage judges in alternative dispute resolution must be
understood, in part, as an effort to redefine adjudication.
The motivations for advocating ADR to judges are as diverse
as its champions. 20 8 For those who offer themselves for hire to per-
form ADR, there are obvious economic incentives. Others seek
shelter in ADR as a means of resolving their disputes safe from
public scrutiny.20 ' Others simply argue that adjudication is too
attributes of judicial power" to agencies).
199 See E. LIND & J. SHAPARD, EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN THREE
FEDERAL DIsTICT COURTS 92-93 (1983); Lambros & Shunk, supra note 146, at 43; Sander,
Varieties of Dispute Processing, 70 F.R.D. 111, 131 (1976).
200 Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(7) (federal judge may, at pretrial conference, discuss the
possibility of the "use of extrajudicial procedures to resolve the dispute").
201 Some of the "alternatives" of earlier years were also genuine supplements, in that,
prior to their enactment, no remedies were available-in court or elsewhere. See Perlin, The
German and British Roots of American Workers' Compensation Systems: When is an "In-
tentional Act" "Intentional"?, 15 S-ToN HALL L. REv. 849, 849 (1985) (workers' compensa-
tion evolved in response to early limitations on ability of workers to sue their employers).
202 Schwartz, supra note 140, at 438-39.
203 See, e.g., Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Struc-
ture of Problem Solving, 31 UCLA L. REv. 754 (1984); Olson, Dispute Resolution: An Alter-
native for Large Case Litigation, LTIGATION, Winter 1980, at 22, 24.
204 See Green, Private Judging, TRAL, Oct. 1985, at 36, 39-40; Note, The California
Rent-a-Judge Experiment: Constitutional and Policy Considerations of Pay-As-You-Go
Courts, 94 HARv. L. RE V. 1592, 1599-1600 (1981).
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cumbersome, that it costs too much, that it requires too much
counter-productive behavior, and that "mini," "summary," or ab-
breviated proceedings are better. Yet others have serious quality
claims to make affirmatively on behalf of ADR.20 5 Some ADR
mechanisms are predicated upon the assumption that litigants,
and not their lawyers, are the key actors to be engaged in dispute
resolution. In contrast to the Federal Rules, which tacitly posit the
lawyer as central, some of the ADR procedures are designed to fos-
ter direct participation by litigants. In this respect, some ADR
mechanisms do not reject the adversarial mode but only question
the faith in the lawyer-client unit. Yet other ADR procedures con-
front the assumptions of the desirability of adversarial approaches
and seek to develop a range of more cooperative responses beyond
those typically employed in and by courts. 0 Underlying all these
diverse views is a shared aversion to adjudication.0 7
While much of the energy for managerial judging and ADR
comes from a desire to produce less expensive outcomes, the two
enterprises do share a qualitative theme: both assume that disposi-
tions based upon the consent of the parties are somehow better
than those achieved by adjudication.0 8 Sometimes "better" simply
means cheaper and quicker. Occasionally, however, "better" is pre-
mised upon something more: that consent is preferable to adjudi-
cation as a basis for action. Again, this notion is not novel;2 09 con-
sent theories animate much of the political discussion in the
208 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 203, at 763-64; Menkel-Meadow, Judges and Set-
tlement, TRiAL, Oct. 1985, at 24, 27. Some of the ADR literature contrasts what it can offer
with court-based remedies, which are described as "win/lose" events. See, e.g., Menkel-
Meadow, supra note 203, at 789-93. I think this view understates the complexity of many
decisions reached by courts, in which parties may both win and lose.
20 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 203, at 789-93; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 189,
at 487.
201 See Chief Justice Urges Greater Use of Arbitration to Relieve Courts of Litigation
Burdens, THE THMD BRANCH, Oct. 1985, at 1, 1 (tort lawsuits divert "people .. from their
normal pursuits and sometimes makes them neurotics").
208 Compare McThenia & Shaffer, supra note 7, at 1664 (settlement "exalts" the reme-
dial process and "calls on substantive community values"), and Menkel-Meadow, supra
note 203, at 754 ("To sue is human, to settle divine"; quoting sign in U.S. Magistrates Of-
fice), with Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: Concerning the Shortage of Adjudicative
Services and the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, HARv. L. REv. (forth-
coming) ("Americans ... settle too many civil cases," and settle them "for the wrong rea-
sons"--inadequate adjudicative services, complex pretrial and trial procedures, substantive
uncertainty, judicial pressures, and strategic oppression), and Fiss, Out of Eden, supra note
7, at 1670 ("Chief Justice Burger is not moved by... a desire to find new ways to restore or
preserve loving relationships, but rather by concerns of efficiency and politics.").
208 For a classic example, see FRANgoIs RABELAis, GARGANTUA AND PANTAGRUEL bk. 3,
chs. 39-43, at 396-408 (J.M. Cohen transl. 1955).
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United States, and those theories are appropriately mirrored in
court processes. But again there has been a shift in emphasis. The
perceived desirability of settlement is based not only upon the gen-
eral "goodness" of consent, but also upon the devaluation of adju-
dication as it is currently conducted with lawyer-based information
generation and presentation. 2 0
In sum, on both the criminal and the civil sides-and relying
upon rules, cases, and informal practices-the judiciary is in the
midst of devising or borrowing mechanisms to bypass adjudication.
Once dispositions are made, they are difficult to undo. Evidence of
this trend appears in a variety of contexts: judicial involvement in
settlement in civil cases, efforts to limit discovery rights, the sug-
gestion of precluding appeals-as-of-right,211 the growth of waiver
doctrines, the increased deference to first-tier decisionmaking. One
wonders whether the current limitations on federal judges' partici-
pation in plea bargaining will last the decade. 12
Some of these procedural reforms appear to be advocated and
propagated by those whose interests are to be served by a decline
in adjudicatory procedure. For example, many defendants (and
their attorneys) in products liability and antitrust cases have
championed the curtailment of discovery and now seem intrigued
by ADR as a means of protecting themselves from negative public-
ity and from outcomes they have disliked.213 Still, much of the en-
ergy comes from judges who are not acting at the behest of such
economic interests. Rather, some judges, who are intimately famil-
210 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 189, at 504-05 (settlement "offers ... substantive
justice that may be more responsive to the parties' needs than adjudication").
211 See Ninth Circuit Senior Advisory Bd., Recommendation to the Ninth Circuit Judi-
cial Council (June 1985, submitted to the Judicial Council in Jan. 1986) (urging the Council
to recommend that the Judicial Conference of the United States study whether the jurisdic-
tion of the courts of appeals should be made discrectionary) (on file with The University of
Chicago Law Review); see also Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal (More or Less) Seri-
ously, 95 YAmx L.J. 62, 63 (1985); Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 603, 605-
06 (1985).
212 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e). See generally Alschuler, The Trial Judge's Role in Plea
Bargaining (pt. 1), 76 COLUm L. REv. 1059, 1061 (1976) (a "bargaining process can operate
in a fairer, more straightforward manner when judges do take an active part").
2' See, e.g., Jefferson, Frankly Speaking: A View from the Other Side of the Glass,
PRODUcrs LIABiLITY, COMMENTARY & CASES 14, 15 (Premiere issue, 1986) (written by Chair-
man, E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.).
The sudden increase in visibility of ADR, which is prompted in part by the interest and
funds provided by corporations and insurance companies, might be understood as an exam-
ple of Marc Galanter's "repeat player" analysis. Those who are repeat players in the litiga-
tion world may make strategic moves not only to win a given case but also to structure the
rules of procedure to their advantange. Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Spec-
ulations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & Soc'y REv. 95, 97, 100-01 (1974).
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iar with the process, are simply and decidedly unhappy about it.
When critics (such as I) propose that managerial judging and ADR
methods should be constrained by procedural requirements such as
recordkeeping and public access, we are met with sometimes pa-
tient,2 14 sometimes impatient,2 15 explanations that "you simply
don't understand: the need is to obtain dispositions and procedural
formality will just slow us down." In the nineteen-thirties, leading
members of the bench and bar were advocating procedural reforms
in which lawyers were assigned a central role to develop informa-
tion which, in turn, would enable adjudication. Their counterparts
today are advocating procedural reforms of a different sort. To-
day's reformers don't seem to like procedural formality, the cen-
trality of lawyers, or adjudication very much at all.
IV. THE FUTURE
How are we to understand the emerging hostility to adjudica-
tion? There are several ways to read this story. First, I may be too
quick to find a decline in faith. Fifty years is but a short span of
time in which to assess the longevity of procedural developments.
One might read Walters, for example, as remarkable because three
members of the Supreme Court said for the first time that the Vet-
erans Administration, long exempt from much judicial oversight,1
should be required to admit attorneys to its proceedings. Similarly,
while Congress has not provided full legal services for the poor,
Congress has provided some. The recent diminution in the insis-
21 See Peckham, supra note 175, at 260-67.
,15 See Flanders, supra note 176.
,14 See generally Rabin, Preclusion of Judicial Review in the Processing of Claims for
Veterans' Benefits: A Preliminary Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 905, 905 (1975) ("The Veter-
ans Administration stands in splendid isolation as the single federal administrative agency
whose major functions are explicitly insulated from judicial review."). For movement away
from that isolation, see Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 373-74 (1974) (constitutional chal-
lenge to the VA not barred); Crowne v. Walters, 53 U.S.L.W. 2452-53 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1985)
(No. 82-0827) (judicial review of claims that VA misinterpreted its own regulations). Simi-
larly, while the Supreme Court has declined to require attorneys for indigent parents in all
proceedings to terminate their rights, the Court has required lawyers in some of the cases.
See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 1, 8 (1981). The Court has also recently reaf-
firmed the important role counsel plays in criminal cases. See Maine v. Moulton, 106 S. Ct.
477, 484 (1985) (counsel must be provided at all critical times after judicial proceedings are
commenced). Moreover, one could understand that some of the statutory, regulatory, and
constitutionally-based constraints imposed upon entities like the United States Parole Com-
mission represent major increases in adjudicatory modes in an arena heretofore uncon-
strained by such requirements. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.1-2.63 (1985) (Parole Commission regula-
tions); Curtis, Federal Judicial Power, Parole Guidelines, and Sentence Reform, in 2
PmsoNNms' RIGHTS SOuRCHBOOK 91, 106 (L Robbins ed. 1980).
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tence on lawyer-based adjudicatory procedure may be only a tem-
porary downward turn. My skepticism of this interpretation is evi-
dent, but the perspective of another fifty years will be necessary to
know which vantage point was correct.
A second possibility is that the current rhetoric is the transla-
tion of the concerns of the nineteen-thirties into contemporary
terms. In this view, faith has not failed; it has evolved. In the
nineteen-thirties, the rulemakers railed against the technical,
"rigid" procedure of their time and sought flexibility by liberal
rules of pleading and by discovery (to get to the "truth" quickly).
What they wanted-simplicity, decisions on the merits, a reduc-
tion of reversals on appeal because of procedural mistakes-is
what current commentators want. Only the techniques have
changed. Then, the hope was that, once freed from the rigidity of
the past, adjudication after adversarial encounters shaped by law-
yers would produce just results. Today, the hope is that a dimin-
ished role for lawyers, fewer opportunities for adversarial develop-
ment of information, and minimal judicial decisionmaking will
produce just results. Both generations share a hostility towards
procedure used as an obstacle to truth. Hence, there is no failure of
faith but a new insight into where to place faith-today, in a
framework that limits the roles played by lawyers and, to a lesser
extent, by judges. Further, while the rulemakers of fifty years ago
understood some of the problems of parity and attorney misbehav-
ior but thought that the Rules were not the place in which to re-
spond, we have learned that rules of procedure must be structured
with those concerns in mind. One difficulty with this interpretation
is that it assumes a deep concern among today's reformers for the
quality of outcomes rather than the quantity of outcomes pro-
duced-a concern less than dominant in the current debate.21
A third way to make sense of the changes in the last fifty years
is to see them as part of a broader trend in contemporary political
culture. In the nineteen-thirties, the rule drafters seemed to have
had faith not only in lawyer-based adjudicatory procedures but
also in lawyer-based reforms in general. These gentlemen spoke
about justice, truth, and the grand accomplishments of the legal
profession as if they genuinely believed in them all. The Federal
217 See Rule 16 Commentary, supra note 188; Landsman, The Decline of the Adver-
sary System: How the Rhetoric of Swift and Certain Justice has Affected Adjudication in
American Courts, 29 BuFFALo L. REV. 487, 488 (1980). But see Menkel-Meadow, supra note
189, at 514 ("I cast my vote for quality"). Of course, we lack measures of quality for the
outcomes in adjudication, although we have developed surrogate measures.
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Rules of Civil Procedure were drafted and praised as the New Deal
was being put into place. Lawyers were, as Gerald Gawalt has la-
beled them, the "new high priests, ' 218 and they carried their faith
in their abilities and messages into all areas of government. In the
intervening fifty years, many of these beliefs have been shaken.
Professionalism holds fewer promises; self-interest is readily evi-
dent, and indeterminacy is all too apparent. While faith in reli-
gious movements may be on the increase, secular faith in group
endeavors to benefit society is in decline in general. Procedure is
only one arena in which failing faith is evident. From this vantage
point, federal judges and proceduralists simply share in a wide-
spread nihilism.
A fourth possibility is that a decline in the valuation of proce-
dure is based upon a realistic appraisal of its potential. During the
nineteen-thirties, some of the rule drafters may have been skepti-
cal about ultimate truth (those were the days, after all, in which
legal realism emerged), but they seemed in their public commen-
tary to have faith in relying upon procedures to legitimate out-
comes. The belief was that better procedures produced better facts
which in turn yielded preferable outcomes. Such a faith was reiter-
ated in the due process revolution of the late sixties and early sev-
enties, as procedure became a major medium for protecting indi-
viduals' opportunities to challenge their government. Indeed the
due process revolution might be understood as valuing procedure
as much as outcomes (and has been criticized for valuing proce-
dure more than outcomes).2 1 9 During the past fifteen years, proce-
dure has proved to be an insufficient medium by which to express
concern about individual dignity. The problems sought to have
been resolved through procedural reform persist, and some accuse
procedure of masking or worsening the indignities visited upon the
citizenry.220 The decline in faith in adjudication and some of the
open hostility towards the courts are based upon this absence of
progress.
A final possibility is that no one ever cares about adjudicatory
procedure per se. It is always a means to an end-a technique for
establishing another agenda. The "procedure" cases of the
216 THE NEw HIGH PRIESTS, supra note 25, at vii.
19 See, e.g., Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE
L.J. 1198, 1201-04 (1983).
210 Id. at 1200-22. Simon argues that, in part because of the due process litigation of
the last two decades, social workers are permitted less discretion in dealing with those on
welfare-a change that has worsened the lives of beneficiaries.
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nineteen-fifties, sixties, and early seventies could all be understood
as not really about process but as efforts to use procedure to
achieve results the Court believed appropriate. The contemporary
"procedure" cases simply exemplify the agenda of a new majority.
Similarly, one could understand the rulemaking activities as
prompted by goals other than procedural reform. In the nineteen-
thirties, lawyers and judges saw the possibility of improving their
lot by restructuring the ways in which they worked, so they advo-
cated a series of rule reforms which enhanced their professional
lives and which advanced the interests of their clients.22' Today, a
new generation of lawyers and judges struggles to rid itself of the
conditions found oppressive. Bored with the tedium of writing, an-
swering, and ruling upon discovery requests, fearful of public criti-
cism of the waste and inefficiencies of their work, lawyers and
judges once again propose new reforms to protect self-interest.
Lawyers seek new arenas in which to work; now the training ses-
sions encompass information about the role of the lawyer in alter-
native dispute resolution. Judges, facing an increasingly bureau-
cratic task, are searching for means by which to rise above that
anonymous role.222
However one reads the story, we must come to terms with con-
temporary events; we must rewrite or leave untouched the federal
rules of practice and procedure. What then are the options before
us? The answers will vary depending upon which of the several
readings proposed above is adopted. For example, if one under-
stands the last fifty years as evidencing a continuing commitment
to lawyer-based adjudicatory procedure, then all that needs to be
done is to try harder to make that vision work. This approach
would require several reforms, including substantial funding for
those not able to afford to "do battle." Not only would the budget
of the judiciary have to be increased, but we would also have to
make more money available (whether by constitutional interpreta-
tion or by legislative enactment) for criminal defense and for legal
services in a variety of contexts.2 3 Competency levels for lawyers
221 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. John Leubsdorf makes a parallel argu-
ment for current support by attorneys for statutes mandating court-awarded fees. See
Leubsdorf, supra note 129, at 33.
222 See Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALr L.J. 1442, 1443 (1983).
22 The current limits on the Legal Services Corporation would have to be reconsid--
ered. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 1611.3(b) (1984) (income not to exceed 125% of the Federal
Poverty Income Guidelines); id. § 1615.2-.3 (legal services may not be rendered to prisoners
seeking habeas corpus relief); id. § 1617.3 (class actions may only be litigated with approval
of local office director).
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would have to be established and policed224 to ensure that the
funding was accomplishing its objectives.
Funding the underequipped or the unequipped would not suf-
fice; we have come to understand that problems in the adversarial
model arise not only from an absence of resources but also from an
abundance of resources. 225 Thus, we would have to take the enter-
prise of regulating litigation-as suggested by some of the 1983
amendments to the Federal Rules-substantially further. We
would have to contemplate ceilings as well as floors on expendi-
tures specific to particular kinds of cases. Substantial sophistica-
tion would be required. Given the complexity of the task, its ex-
pense, and today's anti-regulatory climate, this alternative is
unlikely to be popular.228
While this first approach may not be feasible, a related version
may draw more support. Accepting the absence of major new
funds, we might assume that a partially working, lawyer-based ad-
judicatory process (a "second best" solution) is preferable to other
options. For example, while the marketplace for attorney services
is complex, government intervention and some private market ar-
rangements (such as the contingency fee) have provided attorneys
and resources for some groups of litigants.22 A semblance of bal-
ance exists, and adjudication can occur in a fraction of the cases
filed. Perceiving the sometimes functioning of the adversarial adju-
dicatory process as a major accomplishment, one might urge minor
tinkering but with essential fidelity to the current procedures. The
weakness of this response is its failure to address the constant
stream of criticism about attorney misbehavior, the sprawling na-
ture of many disputes, and the dissatisfaction of many participants
with the current procedures. If I am correct, and faith is falling,
constancy to the old order has a martyr-like quality.
2" See Genego, The Future of Effective Assistance of Counsel: Performance Stan-
dards and Competent Representation, 22 Am. CpiM. L. REv. 181, 203-11 (1984).
'" See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 268 (2d Cir. 1979)
(describing extensive pretrial activity), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); JAMEs STEWART,
THE PARTNERS 327-65 (1983) (describing the Kodak litigation); see also Miller, supra note
129, at 9 (adversarial efforts to exhaust opponents by a plethora of papers).
226 See, e.g., Levine, Is Regulation Necessary? California Air Transportation and Na-
tional Regulatory Policy, 74 YALE L.J. 1416 (1965); Levine, Revisionism Revised? Airline
Deregulation and the Public Interest, 44 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 179 (1981).
W Two forms of intervention are currently in use--direct subsidy and fee shifting. The
Legal Services Corporation Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996a-2996k (1982), and the Criminal Justice
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1982), are examples of direct subsidies. For a list of federal fee-
shifting statutes, see Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. 3012, 3035-39 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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If one holds the view that a new faith has evolved over the
past half century, another possibility is to embrace a new agenda:
develop means to produce inexpensive outcomes in the mass of
cases now before the courts. Relying upon Justice Rehnquist's
views in the veterans' benefits case, one could champion the deliv-
ery of decisions to vast numbers of persons in an "informal,"
"nonadversarial" context.228 In such schemes, the government and
the applicants are viewed as sharing a unity of interests. The for-
malities of lawyers, records, and statements of reasons for deci-
sions-understood as constraints upon abuses of power-are not
needed. The juvenile court reforms of the early part of this century
were founded in part upon such a view, as were reforms of prisons
and other institutions.229 Some of us read the history of those
movements as establishing that such faith in those charged with
making decisions about others' lives is misplaced.230 But other
commentators are more sanguine about the ability of judges, other
governmental officials, and private decisionmakers to perform their
tasks well without formal constraints. Advocates of managerial
judging and ADR are among those confident that informal exer-
cises of power can be used wisely as well as effectively.23
As the title of this essay indicates, my sense is that faith in
adjudication has declined. I am, however, slow to embrace the faith
which proponents of managerial judging and ADR urge upon us.
My sympathies for and difficulties with both movements are
animated by the same concerns. I agree that the procedural format
crafted fifty years ago no longer responds adequately to many is-
sues that consume us today: the gross imbalance between litigants
in certain kinds of disputes, the inabilities and misbehavior of law-
yers and parties in categories of cases, the large number of disputes
seeking attention, and the enormous difficulties, in some cases, in
228 Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 105 S. Ct. 3180, 3196 (1985).
229 ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEsT-LAID PLANS: AMERICA'S JUVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT 35-
56 (1978); EsTELLE FREEDMAN, THEm SISTERS' KEEPERS: WOMEN'S PRISON REFORM 109-25
(1981).
220 See, e.g., W. GAYLIN, I. GLASSER, S. MARCUS & D. ROTHMAN, DOING GOOD: THE LnsMIs
OF BENEVOLENCE 105-24 (1976).
221 In managerial judging, for example, the assumption is that judicial intervention pro-
motes quick outcomes and that formality inhibits the useful role managerial judges can
play. Some have linked the emergence of managerial approaches to the acceptance of conti-
nental approaches to procedure. See, e.g., Langbein, supra note 44, at 858-63; Alschuler,
supra note 208, at 44-57. According to Professor Langbein, German judges are substantially
constrained by their training and selection and by the prospect of de novo appellate review.
But Langbein nonetheless advocates that the United States adopt the German model de-
spite the absence of such constraints in this system. Langbein, supra note 44, at 848-57.
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claiming that the outcomes achieved resemble "truth" or any ap-
proximation of it. However, the new replacements seem to me to
share some of the same failings. Indeed, as I look at the supple-
ments, like managerial judging and much of the ADR menu, I find
them unresponsive to the very concerns that prompt some of their
advocates to commend them.
If we all agree that imbalance is a problem in many cases, that
attorneys or parties are exploitative or inept, that lots of cases are
demanding attention and that legitimate outcomes are difficult to
generate, then how do quick dispositions help-other than by
obfuscating the problems we have found? Are settlements achieved
under conditions of imbalance, lawyer ineptitude, indeterminacy,
and judicial coercion any better than adjudication reached under
similarly troubling conditions? Can the label "consent" solve any
more problems than does the label "judgment"?23 2
Especially troubling for me is the fact that these alternatives
empower decisionmakers without providing sufficient justification
of why they deserve expanded authority. I am sympathetic to the
needs to improve our responses to disputes. I have no romantic or
nostalgic attachment to any particular procedural form. But I do
hold a strong commitment to the need for constraint of all actors,
judges and other decisionmakers, parties, and lawyers, and I am
uneasy about approaches which slide over the problem of con-
straint. Adjudication is far from perfect. But what it offers is deci-
sionmaking by government-empowered individuals who have some
accountability both to the immediate recipients of the decisions
and to the public at large. Our current definitions of adjudication
include a packet of attributes which I continue to respect. Judges
must work within reach of the public; some of the processes occur
literally in view of the public, and most decisions made in private
are reported to the public.2 33 When juries decide, no reasons must
I In this sense, I am less sanguine than Owen Fiss about the ability of adjudication to
right the balance. See Fiss, Against Settlement, supra note 7, at 1076-78.
23 On the criminal side, the public's right of access to trial and trial-like proceedings
has been established. See Waller v. Georgia, 104 S. Ct. 2210, 2216 (1984) (sixth amendment
rights of accused); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580 (1980) (first
amendment rights of audience). The public's rights of access to civil proceedings and to
pretrial activities are less clearly established. See Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 104 S. Ct.
2199, 2206-07 (1984) (litigant has no "unrestrained right to disseminate information...
obtained through pretrial discovery"); In re Reporters' Committee for Freedom of the Press,
773 F.2d 1325, 1338-39 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (because lawsuit between corporate officers of Mobil
Oil Corporation and the Washington Post is a "private" case, the public interest in its out-
come is reduced and the right of access to papers filed in the case is limited). But cf. In re
San Juan Star Co., 662 F.2d 108, 118 (1st Cir. 1980) (implying that first amendment may
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be given; the community's judgment, as expressed by this ad hoc
political institution, requires no explanation. But when judges, who
regularly hold the government's power of decision, render judg-
ment, articulated explanation is demanded. In many instances, un-
happy litigants can voice their displeasure by invoking appellate
review, and judicial decisionmaking is bounded by a series of
norms about acceptable behavior. These safeguards are far from
complete; poor decisions continue to be rendered and to survive,
and judges have much unreviewable power. But the adjudicatory
mode offers some theory of its own limits, of what counts as per-
missible and impermissible adjudication. The "alternatives" to it
have yet to articulate how we might assess the legitimacy of the
outcomes achieved. Speed and superficial lack of expense are, in
and of themselves, incomplete answers.
The lessons of the last fifty years are that unbounded faith is
not enough, that we need to articulate the goals we hope to accom-
plish by structuring systems for the processing of disputes, and
then to pay careful attention to the implementation of those goals.
Because I still have faith that procedure has dignitary functions,234
and because I lack utter faith in the unbounded and disinterested
wisdom of government and of powerful lawyers and litigants, I am
unwilling to turn over the task of procedural modeling to those
who evidence blind faith in alternatives to adjudication or who evi-
dence no faith at all.
VI. THE FEDERAL RULES
With the lessons from the past fifty years in mind, I address
the more immediate task: how to approach the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, fifty years later. I think we need to acknowledge
that frank reconsideration of the Rules has begun, sub silentio, by
the many changes advocated, some of which (such as managerial
judging and attorney sanctions) are already in place. But to speak
openly about a comprehensive review is not to urge abandonment
of all (or many) of the choices made fifty years ago; rather, these
choices must be considered in light of the developments of the last
five decades. In short, I hope that we celebrate the fiftieth anniver-
sary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure with sympathetic ad-
miration; we know not what events will make our own work time-
bound.
protect right to disclose discovery material to the public).
234 See Resnik, supra note 139, at 845-59.
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Given the problems of contemporary litigation, the Rules need
reworking in several respects. First, the trans-substantive premise
of the Rules has proved unworkable. We must face that, whatever
the horrors of forms of action, we need to determine what subsets
of cases require special kinds of rules, and write rules for those
kinds of cases. Thus, a plea for contextualism.
One risk in this approach must be flagged at the outset. It is
easy, as the papers in this symposium illustrate,3 5 to revamp the
Rules solely to meet the problems created by high visibility law-
suits-the toxic tort and other mega-cases that have stimulated
much of the current commentary on the federal courts. Given the
membership of the Advisory Committee and the work experiences
of many who comment upon procedure, the so-called "ordinary
case,"236 in which the Court and the parties invest few or no re-
sources, is often forgotten.23 7 It is important that we keep in mind
that more than 40 percent of the federal docket ends without any
court action whatsoever 2 8 and that 50 percent of federal cases are
estimated to be withdrawn or settled without any discovery.2 9 In
our efforts to curb abuses and to police adversarial excesses and
adjudicatory weaknesses in the "Big Case," we must be careful not
to impose inappropriate burdens on the so-called "ordinary case."
Let me provide two examples. Some local districts, distressed
about attorneys' behavior in discovery, now require attorneys who
request court assistance in obtaining discovery to document their
efforts to confer with opposing counsel.240 This documentation re-
quirement may make sense in the context of a case laden with dis-
covery problems. Further, a local rule counseling cooperation may
be good advice in all cases. The documentation requirement, how-
ever, may so increase the costs of discovery that a party seeking
court aid on a small matter may be deterred. Similarly, Rule 16's
requirement that the court issue a pretrial schedule within 120
days of the filing of a complaint may be appropriate for cases with
a foreseeable activity-filled pretrial period. But for the more than
forty percent of cases that terminate without any court action, the
E.g., Brazil, supra note 145; Schuck, supra note 9.
216 See Trubek et al., supra note 114, at 83-84, 89-90.
3 See Subrin, The Law and the Rules, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 1979, at p. 23, col. 4.
1" 1984 ADMImSTRATIVE OFFICE REPORT, supra note 6, at 280 (47%). Of course, some of
these are the contemporary "hip pocket" cases-the parties hope never to litigate, and use
the filing as a mechanism to obtain a settlement.
1' P. CONNOLLY, E. HouI isAN & M. KuLmAN, supra note 114, at 28 (based upon discov-
ery requests recorded with the court).
240 See, e.g., CAL. LocAL RuLas CODE §§ 7.15.1-7.15.2, at 750 (West 1985) (C.D. Cal.).
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time spent creating a pretrial schedule is wasted. At first glance,
Rule 16 seems to acknowledge and solve this problem: the Advi-
sory Committee notes provide that district courts may, by local or-
der, exempt categories of cases from the pretrial schedule require-
ment. Yet the notes suggest that such exceptions be made for cases
involving habeas corpus, forfeiture, and social security disability is-
sues 24 1-cases litigated by the very individuals particularly in need
of judicial assistance to bridge adversarial imbalances. Rather than
showing sensitivity to the problems raised by different kinds of
cases, the current version of Rule 16 exemplifies the need for
thoughtful contextual analysis.
Moving to a process point, the trans-substantive Rules could
be contextualized in one of two fashions-through ad hoc decision-
making by individual judges or districts, or through comprehensive
rulemaking. My own views on this issue are well-known; I am
deeply skeptical of the capacity of individual judges to craft rules
on a case-by-case basis. 42 Federal judges tell us repeatedly that
they are overwhelmed by their caseloads. I do not believe that
these judges can perform their adjudicatory tasks and still have
sufficient time to ascertain which mode of procedure is best suited
to each individual case. 43 Moreover, I have substantial reserva-
tions about the propriety of such an ad hoc judicial enterprise. De-
ciding how to mold procedures to a given case may well involve a
judge so deeply in managerial and adversarial events that it under-
mines the ability of the judge to adjudicate-should that become
2,1necessary. 4 Therefore, I suggest that federal judges participate in
the effort to review the Rules, rather than in the design of specific
procedures for each case.243
Third, the Rules must come to grips with the question of court
regulation of attorneys. We can no longer leave attorney behavior
241 FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b), 1983 Advisory Committee Note.
242 See Resnik, supra note 17, at 417-31.
143 According to Hon. Gerald L. Goettel of the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, judges on that court have, at most, one half an hour of time
to devote to the pretrial process of the cases on their dockets. Letter from Hon. Gerald L.
Goettel (May 13, 1986) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review).
244 In recognition of this problem, some federal districts have local rules which, absent
the parties' consent, prohibit judges who participate in settlement negotiations from presid-
ing at trial. See, e.g., CAL. Civm RuLEs CODE § 240-1, at 685 (West 1985) (N.D. Cal.). The
Chief Judge of the Northern District of California suggests that settlement negotiations be
referred to a different judge or to a magistrate. See Peckham, supra note 156, at 264; see
also Schuck, supra note 9, at 364 (discussing the option).
245 Of course, the application of rules involves judicial discretion; some judicial tailor-
ing of rules to fit the needs of specific cases is inevitable and appropriate. What must be
avoided is unrestrained discretion.
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to ethical codes and assume the feasibility of procedural rules that
ignore lawyers' practices. One interesting effort to draft standards
of behavior for lawyers and incorporate them into court rules has
been made by a group spearheaded by Jack Weinstein, Chief
Judge of the Eastern District of New York. He recently adopted a
standing order, drafted by a group of lawyers, that provides de-
tailed explanations of appropriate discovery practice.2 46 Rules of
procedure must detail what attorney conduct is to be counte-
nanced and what is to be penalized.4
Finally, we must decide what the Rules should say about set-
tlement-and specifically, about the judge's role in shaping settle-
ments. Some may think that proposing rulemaking about settle-
ment is odd. Settlement is, after all, an agreement between the
parties to conclude their dispute without adjudication, and
rulemaking implies the need to regulate some adjudicatory func-
tion of judges. But both the Rules and practice have drawn judges
into two phases of the settlement process: negotiating settlements
and approving settlements. The task of approving settlements
came first; the 1938 Rules required that class actions would not be
withdrawn or compromised without court approval. The 1983
amendments have given judges a role in designing settlements; rule
16 now provides that settlement and the "use of extrajudicial pro-
cedures" (a/k/a ADR) are two of the "subjects to be discussed at
pretrial conferences. '248 That amendment confirmed a role that
many judges had already assumed. Further, the debate of the last
few years about enlarging the scope of rule 68 is, at heart, a debate
about how much power to accord judges in promoting settlements.
One proposed revision of rule 68 would have added a third settle-
ment-related task to judges' platters-sanctioning parties who
"unreasonably" refused to settle.249 One need not be in favor of
such an expansion of the judicial role to understand the need for
rulemaking in this area; problems appear under the current Rules.
As the Agent Orange example demonstrates, judges currently par-
ticipate in the structure of a settlement and then sit in judgment
See supra note 148.
247 I do not underestimate the difficulties of such an enterprise. The implementation of
Judge Weinstein's rules is proving to be difficult, and one of the major problems is the
frequent turnover of lawyer personnel (in large law firms and in government) during the
course of a lawsuit. Conversations with Prof. Margaret Berger, Principal Investigator,
Brooklyn Law School Project on Discovery (Oct. 1985 & Apr. 1986).
I's FED. R. CIv. P. 16(c).
24, See Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. 3012, 3033-34 & nn.56-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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to approve the "fairness" of the bargain made. 250 Finally, the erup-
tion of interest in settlement stands alongside the many federal
statutes which provide incentives for successful litigants; we en-
courage filings of lawsuits yet discourage their adjudication.
In what capacity do judges act when raising the issue of settle-
ment, when directing parties to engage in ADR, or when approving
the compromises reached? Are judges who require settlement ne-
gotiations implementing a societal decision that we no longer offer
trial-as-of-right to any litigant who so desires and who has the re-
sources and stamina to insist upon one? Or does judicial promotion
of settlement signal an all-encompassing preference for settlement
over adjudication, wherever and whenever possible? Are there cat-
egories of cases in which such a preference is inappropriate? 25 1
We must consider not only the legitimacy of the pursuit of
settlement but the more specific question of the sources and scope
of judicial authority over that activity. At the doctrinal level, it is
not clear in what ambit a federal judge works when involved in
settlement. Three members of the Supreme Court have suggested
that, once the parties have agreed to withdraw or settle a lawsuit,
no "case or controversy" exists, and judges therefore lack the
power to insist upon any particular agreement.2 52 Under this view,
legislation or rules that grant judges authority to restructure ele-
ments of settlements are unconstitutional, and judges cannot insist
upon provisions to protect the parties or the public. Recently, a
majority of the Court endorsed a weaker version of a doctrinal lim-
itation on judicial involvement in settlement. While assuming that
judges have the power to "approve or reject a settlement negoti-
ated by the parties," the Court insisted that judges lack authority
to "require the parties to accept a settlement to which they had
not agreed. '25 3 By implication, judges may also have no role in ne-
210 See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 611 F. Supp. 1396,
1410 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (settlement was "fair, reasonable and adequate").
251 Proposed drafts for revision of Rule 68 have included suggestions that its sanctions
not be applied in cases involving class actions or those seeking injunctive relief. Proposed
Court Rules, supra note 152, at 432-44. Opponents of the proposal, myself among them,
have argued that the exemptions stated are too narrow; in our view, sanctions for insisting
upon trials are inappropriate in any case in which Congress has created statutory incentives
to litigate. USC Law Professors' Testimony, supra note 172, at 7-8; see also Fiss, Against
Settlement, supra note 7, at 1085-90 (objecting particularly to settlements in certain kinds
of cases, but also rejecting a "two track" system in which some cases are slated for settle-
ments, others for adjudication).
252 Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001, 1004-06 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., joined by
Burger, C.J., and White, J., dissenting).
253 Evans v. Jeff D., 106 S. Ct. 1531, 1537 (1986).
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gotiating (rather than ordering) terms of settlements; either the
parties have a "case" for which adjudication is required, or the
parties make private compromises to avoid adjudication.
The Federal Rules-both criminal and civil-contain echoes
of the ambiguity about the judicial role in settlement. The Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly prohibit a federal judge
from "participat[ing] in any [settlement] discussions," although
the prosecution and defense can negotiate a settlement which in-
cludes a specific sentence and the judge may accept or reject that
agreement. 54 In contrast, the Civil Rules permit judges to discuss
settlement at pretrial conferences.2 55 Both sets of Rules authorize
judges to disapprove of some settlements. In criminal cases, the
government may not withdraw indictments without court permis-
sion; however, the rule is silent on when "leave of court" should be
denied.56 Plea bargains are also not final absent court inquiry into
defendants' understandings of the options available. 257 In civil
cases, class actions and receiverships may not be withdrawn or
compromised without court approval, but again no test for that ap-
proval is provided.15 The justification for court approval in both
criminal cases and class actions is the same: the judicial role is to
protect third parties (in the criminal context, the public, and in
the class action context, the physically absent members of the
class) from decisions made by potentially disloyal representa-
tives.259 In other words, we explicitly question the adequacy of the
"consent" to judgment. However, what we do with our qualms is
less clear; short of adjudication, judges have difficulty assessing the
quality and fairness of the agreements reached. Further, compel-
ling individuals to litigate is problematic; the very rare refusal of a
district court to accept a prosecution's motion to dismiss an indict-
ment is testimony to those difficulties.2 60 Finally, aside from the
criminal area, class actions and receiverships, and a few special
I" FED. R. CraM. P. 11(e)(2).
:55 FED. RF Civ. P. 16(a)(5).
56 Judicial supervision of such decisions has in fact been minimal. See United States v.
Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 514-15 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976).
257 FED. R CRIM. P. 11(c).
258 FED. R Civ. P. 23(e), 66.
259 In addition, in the criminal context, the court's supervision is intended to protect
the defendant from poor counsel or prosecutorial overreaching and to protect the conviction,
once obtained, from collateral attack.
260 E.g., United States v. Cowan, 524 F.2d 504, 512 (5th Cir. 1975) (" 'Few subjects are
less adapted to judicial review than the exercise by the Executive of his discretion in decid-
ing when and whether to institute criminal proceedings'") (quoting Newman v. United
States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967)).
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statutory schemes,261 the Federal Rules give judges no official role
in approving settlements. In the bulk of civil litigation, the parties'
decisions to settle are not subjected to review. 262
It is not only the potential absence of judicial power over set-
tlement that is problematic; many fear that during settlement ne-
gotiations, judges may have too much authority. The literature on
judicial settlement activities documents the subtle and not so sub-
tle pressures asserted by judges when discussing settlement.263
Some judicial "suggestions" are understood as more than that-as
implicit comments that litigants who insist upon a trial are acting
inappropriately. Again, we are learning that "consent" to judgment
may not, in and of itself, be a sufficient guarantee of quality, fair-
ness, or litigant satisfaction.
What should the Rules say about the problem of settlement?
Should doctrinal hesitations and concerns for abuses of power lead
to the view that judges should only be engaged in adjudication and
have nothing to say about resolutions arrived at without adjudica-
tion? Should our sensitivity to problems of parity and attorney
misbehavior lead us to elaborate upon the class action/criminal
rules, to see the judge as protector of both the parties and the pub-
lic in all cases, and to mandate an active role for the judge in com-
mending specific compromises and disapproving others? If we
adopt this approach, how might a judge determine the propriety of
a given compromise-without some kind of factfinding process?
The cases dealing with class action settlements struggle with this
issue, as the courts have developed criteria (the merits of the offer,
the likelihood of success, the compromises made by both sides)
while cautioning against too much judicial second-guessing or too
much adjudication.26' On the criminal side, judges have noted the
role displacement and intrinsic difficulties of declining to approve
281 See, e.g., Tunney Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 16(b)-(h) (1982) (antitrust actions initiated by
the government cannot be compromised without court inquiry into whether the settlement
is "in the public interest").
2 2 See FED. R. Civ. P. 41 (voluntary dismissals by stipulation of the parties).
':' See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX IMGATION, SECOND § 23.11 (1985) (warning judges
not to permit their involvement in settlement negotiations to undermine the perception of
judicial fairness); see also Kothe v. Smith, 771 F.2d 667, 670 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that a
judge impermissibly imposed sanctions when litigants refused to settle for the amounts sug-
gested by the judge); D. PROVINE, supra note 191, at 30-35.
284 See, e.g., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITGATION, SECOND § 30.41 (1985); Armstrong v.
Board of School Directors, 616 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1980). See also several of the cases consti-
tuting In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation: 611 F. Supp. 1296 (E.D.N.Y.
1985); 611 F. Supp. 1396 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); 611 F. Supp. 1452 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); 618 F. Supp.
623 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
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compromises to withdraw prosecutions, while finding it somewhat
easier to articulate criteria upon which to approve a plea bar-
gain.265 In short, developing norms by which to measure settle-
ments is difficult,266 for without adjudication, how can a judge de-
termine what results are appropriate, what compromises are fair,
or what amount of damages should be awarded? Can we develop
some process in between settlement and adjudication and describe
the appropriate arena within it for judges? Or would (and does)
the involvement of judges in anything less than adjudication di-
minish the legitimacy of adjudication and reduce the utility of
settlement?26 7
At one level, alternative dispute resolution offers some escape
from these difficulties. Instead of employing judges to bring about
resolutions without adjudication, use "alternatives"-magistrates,
special masters, summary jury trials, mini-trials, court-annexed ar-
bitration. But upon reflection, some of the problems associated
with judge-sponsored settlements arise within the ADR context as
well. If, without adjudication, judges lack adequate information
upon which to determine a proper outcome, why should we assume
that judicial surrogates can do any better? If consents to entry of
judgment are entered by disloyal representatives or because of co-
ercion, how does ADR limit such abuses?
One of the answers to the question may well be that it de-
pends upon the form of ADR employed. There is a tendency (evi-
denced in this essay and elsewhere) to lump all ADR processes to-
gether, but perhaps the time has come to draw distinctions among
them. For example, a summary jury trial employs citizens to listen
to an abbreviated account of the events at issue and then to advise
the parties about the jurors' views of the respective rights and obli-
gations; the case is "tried" in public and members of the public
issue a nonbinding judgment. In contrast, court-employed
mediators often work in private, sometimes engaging in shuttle di-
plomacy to convince parties to settle. Because, as described above,
I believe that one of the saving graces of adjudication is its "public
24 The question of whether to approve a plea is not problem-free. See North Carolina
v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31-39 (1970) (accepting defendant's decision to plead guilty even
though he maintained his innocence).
"' See generally Luban, Bargaining and Compromise: Recent Work on Negotiation
and Informal Justice, 14 PmL. & PuB. AFF. 397 (1985) (problems exist even without third
party involvement).
For discussion of how judicial involvement in settlement reduces the legitimacy of
adjudication, see Sarokin, Justice Rushed is Justice Ruined, 38 RUTroaF L. Rav. (forthcom-
ing) (on file with The University of Chicago Law Review).
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dimension"-the accountability and education which flow from its
public, visible nature26s -I have more qualms about mediators
than I do about summary jury trials. (The privacy in which mana-
gerial judges work distresses me for similar reasons.) If we employ
mediators in our publicly-financed system of dispute resolution,
how are we to know what they do? whether we share the norms
they articulate or the values they convey as they attempt to settle
disputes? 269  whether they attempt coercion as a form of
mediation?
Underlying the question of rulemaking about settlement
(whether by judges or through surrogates) is a question of faith.
Implicit in the praise of abbreviated processes, such as informal
settlement conferences and summary jury trials, is the assumption
that the quantum of information produced by adjudication is un-
necessary-that outcomes every bit as good can be produced with
less data, less formality, and fewer constraints. Implicit in claims
for adjudication are beliefs that disputes are often complex and
subtle, that formality empowers, and that those with power must
be constrained. Before we write rules about settlement, we need to
choose one of these views or identify the cases in which to vary our
views. We need further to determine whether we should conserve
and confine judges to their speciality, adjudication,270 or whether
we should assign them the additional task of settlement. If we
choose a strong settlement role, we must determine whether we
can cabin that activity from adjudication and how we can legiti-
mate judicial exercises of power in that arena. Reliance upon some
of the procedures associated with adjudication-visible decision-
making, the creation of records, public scrutiny and participation,
and appellate review-is one way in which to constrain that power,
but if we add all those procedures to judicial settlement or to an
ADR mechanism, have we done anything other than reinvent the
wheel?271 The problem of settlement raises fundamental issues
about the reach of courts' authority. It is tempting to want to ig-
nore these problems, to pass lightly over the conceptual difficulties,
2 See Resnik, The Public Dimension (forthcoming) (on file with the author).
269 For evaluation of the norms employed by mediators in Germany, see Plett, Media-
tion and Settlement of Building Construction Disputes: The Case of the "Bau-Schlich-
tungsstelle" in Frankfurt, West Germany 32-36 (Mar. 1986) (Institute for Legal Studies,
University of Wisconsin at Madison, Dispute Processing Research Program, Working Papers
Series 7).
270 See Resnik, supra note 17, at 430-45.
271 See generally Note, The Dilemma of Regulating Mediation, 22 Hous. L. REv. 841
(1985).
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and to amend rules without facing these questions. But that work
must be done, and, in light of its scope, it should not be left to the
Advisory Committee alone.
These suggestions do not by any means answer all the
problems. For example, what should be done about the sprawling
definition of a "case" that permits the events involving Agent Or-
ange to bear that title? When the number of actors and of events
becomes so great, the ability of adjudication or settlement to offer
acceptable outcomes diminishes. How can any judge, jury, ADR
specialist, or expert digest the mass of information needed for de-
liberative decisionmaking? At such moments, should we abandon
our traditional approaches and delight in innovation? Much of the
commentary about Agent Orange has welcomed such an ap-
proach. 272 But what about the precedent-a judge negotiating the
settlement and then finding it fair? Can we have that model for
some cases, such as the extraordinary events labeled Agent Orange,
but find it impermissible in other settings? Or, will judges, enam-
ored with the import and seeming utility of their innovations, be
content to provide ordinary (sometimes tedious and certainly
rarely glamorous) adjudication for most of their caseload? Will the
innovations always, in practice, find their way into all parts of the
docket?
CONCLUSION
As we sit in contemplation of the enormously powerful work of
the drafters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we must be
careful and thoughtful in our examination of the decisions made
fifty years ago. We must understand that conversations about pro-
cedure are often used as vehicles for many other conversations that
are difficult to have in a straightforward manner. Proposals for
"tort reform" that include caps on liability emanate from those
who have to pay damage awards, as well as from disinterested so-
cial scientists, concerned about the impact of liability rules and the
utility of reliance upon tort litigation for risk-spreading and for de-
terrence.2 73 Desires to abolish appeal-as-of-right come not only
272 See Blumenthal, How U.S. Judge Helped Shape Agent Orange Pact, N.Y. Times,
May 11, 1984, § 1 at 1, col. 2 (one lawyer said, "This was Judge Weinstein's finest hour").
273 The Reagan Administration has proposed federal "reform" legislation in the areas
of products liability, government contractor liability, and federal tort liability, all of which
aim to limit liability. Product Liability Reform Act of 1986 (on file with The University of
Chicago Law Review); Government Contractor Liability Reform Act of 1986, S. 2441, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC. S5814-15 (1986); Federal Tort Claims Reform Act of 1986,
S. 2440, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. Rc. S5812-13 (1986). Two of these proposed bills
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from those interested in decreasing litigation costs but also from
those who wish to give greater power to first-tier decisionmakers
and to restrict individuals' abilities to challenge judicial wrongdo-
ing. In short, some of the current vogue for complaining about
overuse of the courts and of procedural excesses masks an impor-
tant, value-laden debate about individual rights and the role of the
judiciary in this society. In the current surge of concern about pro-
cedural innovation, we must sort out which suggestions are put
forth in an effort to limit judicial power and which are made in an
effort to enhance the judicial function.
Repeatedly these days, prominent jurists (including members
of the Supreme Court) say that litigation and lawyers are bad.
These judges provide those hostile to federal rights with a powerful
rhetoric. I do not find it at all surprising that judges should rail
against caseloads, lawyers, and litigants. From the judicial vantage
point, there must appear a never ending stream of cases, of people,
of problems, of attorney magnification of minor misdeeds. The
yearning for "simple, nonadversarial" resolutions is understanda-
ble. Judges have no respites, no sabbaticals, no large salaries. The
temptation for judges to wish away all the cases, to advocate
higher access fees, fewer appeals, less involvement in adversarial
encounters, and the abandonment of adjudication, must be enor-
mous. I urge that we resist the effort to translate judicial exhaus-
tion into rules or practices that devalue adjudication but offer no
constrained decisionmaking procedure to take its place.
I have painted a story of fifty years with a broad brush. I have
oversimplified and overgeneralized. Counter-examples abound,
contrary trends can be divined, and the world is far more compli-
cated than this essay suggests. Granting all that, we must explore
the value choices of the nineteen-thirties and of today to deter-
mine what kind of procedure to provide those who seek judicial
attention. As we contemplate revisions of the Federal Rules, we
must seek to preserve many of their accomplishments, including
ready access to the judicial apparatus.
also announce it to be the "policy of the United States to encourage" alternative dispute
resolution. Product Liability Reform Act of 1986, § 11; Government Contractor Liability
Reform Act of 1986, § 11.
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APPENDIX B
Table 1
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF COMPLETED CIVIL TRIALS
Year Total No. Civil Actual No. Civil Percentage of Civil
Cases Terminated Trials Completed Trials Completed
1945 52,300 2,835 5.4%
1946 61,000 3,617 5.9%
1947 54,515 5,040 9.2%
1948 48,791 4,586 9.3%
1949 48,396 4,913 10.1%
1950 53,259 4,979 9.3%
1951 52,119 5,051 9.7%
1952 53,150 4,711 8.9%
1953 57,490 4,900 8.5%
1954 57,903 6,943 12.0%
1955 58,974 7,036 11.9%
1956 67,700 7,380 10.9%
1957 63,568 6,892 10.8%
1958 61,285 7,062 11.5%
1959 62,172 6,908 11.1%
1960 61,829 6,488 10.5%
1961 55,416 6,156 11.1%
1962 57,996 n/a* n/a
1963 62,379 n/a n/a
1964 63,954 n/a n/a
1965 65,478 7,613 11.6%
1966 66,184 7,783 11.7%
1967 70,172 8,095 11.5%
1968 68,873 8,688 12.6%
1969 73,354 8,834 12.0%
1970 80,435 9,449 11.7%
1971 86,563 10,093 11.6%
1972 95,181 10,962 11.5%
1973 98,259 10,896 11.0%
1974 97,633 10,972 11.2%
1975 104,783 11,603 11.0%
1976 110,175 11,656 10.6%
1977 117,150 11,604 9.9%
1978 125,914 11,389 9.0%
1979 143,323 11,655 8.1%
1980 160,481 12,951 8.0%
1981 177,975 14,398 8.0%
1982 189,473 14,433 7.6%
1983 215,356 14,391 6.7%
1984 243,113 14,374 5.9%
Data extrapolated from the 1945-84 ADMNISTRAMlv OFFxcE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL
REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR, Tales C1 and C8.
*Tables not published for 1962-64. Conversation with James McCafferty, Statistical Anal-
ysis and Reports Division, Administrative Office of United States Courts, May 16th 1986.
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